The American Ecclesiastical Review

Vol. CXII, No. 3 March, 1945

CONTENTS

Graft and Commutative Justice . *Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R.* 161
The Great Footnote Mystery . . *Edmond Darvil Benard* 172
Education for the Missions . . . *John T. McGinn, C.S.P.* 175
Contardo Ferrini . . . *Edwin G. Kaiser, C.PP.S.* 186
On the Problem of Co-Operation: Some Clarifications *John Courtney Murray, S.J.* 194
Catholic Missions and Communist Tactic *Joseph Clifford Fenton* 215

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

When a Deacon May Bless with the Hand 220
Handling the Sacred Vessels 220
Preaching Costume for Domestic Prelates 221
When Two Prescribed Orations Are Identical . . . 222
Rite of Profession and Renewal of Vows 224
Problems of the C. Y. O. 226

Contents Continued on Next Page

Published monthly by The Board of Trustees of The American Ecclesiastical Review, from The Catholic University of America Press, Washington 17, D. C. Subscription price, U. S. currency or equivalent: United States and Canada, $4.00—Foreign Postage, $1.00 additional. 40 cents per copy.

Entered as second class matter, November 30, 1944, at the Post Office at Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Accepted for mailing at the special rate of postage provided for under Act of March 5, 1930, under Act of February 28, 1925.

Business communications, including subscriptions and changes of address, should be addressed to The American Ecclesiastical Review, The Catholic University of America, Washington 17, D. C.

Please address all manuscripts and editorial correspondence to The Editor, The American Ecclesiastical Review, Box 20A, The Catholic University of America, Washington 17, D. C.

Copyright 1945, by The American Ecclesiastical Review

Contents Continued from Previous Page

Common-Law Marriage 227
Essence of Episcopal Consecration 228
Mass Obligation of Priests' Purgatorial Societies . . . 229

ANALECTA 231

BOOK REVIEWS

Between Heaven and Earth, *by Franz Werfel* . . . 233
Speaking of How to Pray, *by Mary Perkins* 234
Lesson Plans in Religion 236
Three Religious Rebels, *by M. Raymond, O.C.S.O.* . . 237
The Church and the Liberal Society, *by Emmet John Hughes* 238

BOOK NOTES 240

CHANGE OF ADDRESS

We Solicit Your Co-operation

Notice of change of address should be sent to us promptly, and at the same time the old address should be given.

Sometimes a subscriber overlooks reporting change of address; and now and then a subscriber dies, and in either case his copy continues to be sent to his former address. In such cases notification from Successor or Pastor would be appreciated.

You May Use the Blank Below:

NAME: .....

OLD ADDRESS: .....

NEW ADDRESS: .....

OTHER INFORMATION: .....

The American Ecclesiastical Review
The Catholic University of America
Washington 17, D. C.

GRAFT AND COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE

In a previous issue of *The American Ecclesiastical Review* the subject of dishonesty and graft on the part of those in public office was discussed in relation to the virtues of legal and distributive justice.[1] The purpose of the present article is to consider the same subject in relation to commutative justice. By commutative justice is meant the virtue which urges a person to render to a distinct person what is his by strict right. By "person" can be meant not only an individual, but also a group. The feature which essentially distinguishes commutative justice on the one hand from legal and distributive justice on the other is that the two parties involved in commutative justice are entirely distinct from each other, whereas legal and distributive justice essentially connote the inclusion of one in the other. For legal justice urges a part of society to render to the whole society what is its due, while distributive justice urges the whole society to render to a part what is its due. Accordingly, in those transactions between society and an individual in which the individual functions as a distinct entity, commutative justice is involved, just as it is involved in transactions between two private persons. For example, when a citizen labors in building a road for the state, the state is bound in commutative (and not merely distributive) justice to remunerate him. On the other hand, the citizen is bound to give an honest day's work for his salary in commutative (and not merely legal) justice. From this it follows that dishonest dealings by those in public office can extend beyond the bounds of violations of legal and distributive justice and transgress the more fundamental virtue of commutative justice. Indeed, it is the main contention of this paper that such acts of dishonesty are generally opposed to commutative justice, and consequently entail the obligation of restitution.

The standard works on moral theology do not discuss to any considerable extent or in detail the violation of commutative justice involved in the numerous and ingenious ways by which public officials can unlawfully enrich themselves. Doubtless the main reason is that most theological works are of European

[1] *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, CXII, 1 (Jan. 1945), 1-11.

authorship, and graft as a fine art, with its varied and complicated methods, is peculiarly a product of American public life. In the words of Peter H. Odegard: "Among the great modern nations the United States has perhaps the least enviable reputation as regards the probity of its political life."[2] Sometimes in theological books we read the statement that violations of commutative justice are often connected with transgressions against distributive justice,[3] but the treatment of the particular ways in which civil rulers are likely to violate justice is very meager. Archbishop Kenrick devoted only two pages of his three-volume work on Moral Theology to the duties of civil legislators and executives, and said nothing explicitly about their violations of commutative justice, although some of his remarks indicate that he was familiar with the methods of dishonest politicians employed in our country a century ago.[4]

Because the textbooks of theology are so defective in this respect, it is not surprising that priests are hesitant in giving decisions about the morality of certain practices quite common in political life. For, it must be admitted, some of the ways by which public officials enrich themselves are so cleverly protected by the external appearance of respectability and honesty that one might easily be led to believe that, although not the noblest methods of acting, they are free from the guilt of sin. Indeed Fr. McHugh, O.P. includes in the very definition of graft the idea that it is a transaction which is outwardly lawful.[5] At any rate, a priest would not assert that a certain unsavory political practice is opposed to commutative justice, and that in consequence the obligation of restitution is involved, unless he was sure of the theological soundness of his statement—and the average priest does not feel sure of his ground on an important matter unless the theologians support him quite explicitly and definitely.

Because they do not receive sufficiently definite and detailed instructions from their priests, Catholics in public office are inclined to take an easy view of the obligations connected with their civil duties and of the morality of the many means whereby

[2] Article, "Corruption," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York, 1937), II, 452.

[3] Cf. Merkelbach, *Summa Theologiae Moralis* (Paris, 1938), Vol. II, n. 254.

[4] Cf. Kenrick, *Theologia Moralis* (Philadelphia, 1841), I, 398 f.

[5] Cf. *Homiletic and Pastoral Review*, XXXVIII, 3 (Dec. 1937), 242.

they can earn something "on the side." Consequently, there are some Catholic politicians who, in perfect good faith, regard the thousands of dollars that they acquire by intrigue and bribery as "honest graft." They would not consider themselves bound to mention these transactions in confession, and still less to renounce the huge sums and magnificent possessions they have amassed from a career in politics.

Now, the simple truth is that the phrase "honest graft" is a contradiction in terms; and that in practically all instances in which a person in public life grows richer by virtue of that office over and above his salary, he is violating commutative justice. I say that this occurs in *practically* all instances, for there can be exceptions in the matter of small gifts. The letter carrier who is presented with a Christmas gift of five dollars by a business man to whom he has been delivering mail, and the patrolman who is given a box of cigars from a storekeeper on his beat can accept these offerings without any qualms of conscience, if they do not allow these gifts to affect their official service—in a word, if they perform their duties just as faithfully for those who do not donate as for those who do. But when there is question of "big money" —when a public official profits from some service to the extent of hundreds or even thousands of dollars—it is absurd to speak of a "gift." It is undoubtedly a matter of bribery or extortion. He is receiving money either to render a service which he should not render or to render a service which he is supposed to perform freely, but actually will not perform unless he is paid for it.

Under the following four headings I have grouped many (though certainly not all) of the dishonest practices resorted to by officeholders for their personal advantage. My purpose is to discuss in what manner a violation of commutative justice is involved in these transactions. Probably not all theologians would agree with all my conclusions. I would welcome other views on this very important topic. I readily admit that the transgression of commutative justice is not immediately evident in all cases; and I know full well that there are many public officials—some of them Catholics, who regularly approach the sacraments and are above reproach in their private lives—who deem these transactions legitimate means of emolument connected with their office and salve their conscience with the argument: "Every one

does it." But, in the eyes of God, that argument does not justify the violation of His law.

(1) A public official sometimes receives a substantial sum from those whom he appoints to a job. Thus, there may be five vacancies in the clerical staff of the city hall, and there are fifty applicants. The official charged with hiring these assistants lets five of the group know that the promise or handing over of $100 will secure an appointment. Now, it might be argued that the official is free to appoint any five of the applicants, and that if he chooses to appoint those who will do him a favor in return, he is guilty of no injustice—not to the others because they had no right to the job, and not to the chosen ones because they are willing to give the $100. But such an argument is very specious. For, although the official may have a certain measure of discretionary power in the selection of the clerks, he has no right to make his *personal* profit the norm of selection. By virtue of his office, he is empowered and obligated to choose them without making personal gain a condition of selection. This duty is included in the scope of his salary, and by demanding payment for an appointment he is seizing a sum of money to which he has no just title. To say that the favored candidates are willing to pay is no justification; for their willingness is the result of his unjust coercion. In the same sense a parent whose child is kidnapped may be willing to pay ransom for its return, but that gives the kidnapper no title to the money. In both cases there is the crime of extortion, pure and simple, and commutative justice is violated.

Futhermore, the official in question has not full discretionary power of selection. If there is a difference of merit and ability among the candidates, he would fail against distributive justice if he did not choose those who appear the most worthy and most capable. If he chose a clerk who was positively unworthy—one who could not satisfactorily perform the duties of the office—he would also fail against commutative justice in respect to the state. In the very hypothetical supposition that all the candidates for an office are of equal worth, some objective standard must be sought as a basis of selection. Those who had first applied could be preferred, or the age of the applicants could be the deciding factor. Even the selection by drawing the names of the lucky ones from an urn would not be wrong—but any mode of choosing those to be given the appointment that is based on payment by

the appointee to the appointer is substantially the same procedure as highway robbery.

The same conclusion applies to the official who requires his subordinates to pay him tribute in order to retain their jobs, and to the license commissioner who will grant shopkeepers a license only on condition that they remunerate him (the alternative being that he will refuse the license on some specious pretext), and to the judge in a civil suit who gives his decision in favor of the party actually in the right, but does so only in consideration of a substantial sum.[6] All these are cases of extortion. It makes no difference whether the money is paid before or after the official places the desired act; neither does it change the nature of the sin if the graft assumes the guise of a free gift. True, a spontaneous gift from one who has received a benefit from a public official can be accepted without violation of justice, even though the conferring of the benefit was a part of his bounden duty. But, if it is clearly understood by both parties that failure to remunerate will mean that the recalcitrant citizen will be effectively penalized (particularly by the rejection of his reasonable petition or just right on a future occasion), the transaction is no longer the spontaneous conferring of a gift but the rapacious extraction of a bribe.

In the supposition that there is a violation of civil service regulations in the distribution of jobs—in other words, if another candidate is fraudulently preferred to one who had a right to the job by the norms of civil service legislation—the official who perpetrated the wrong violates commutative justice in respect to the rejected candidate. He must recompense the latter for the amount which he lost in consequence of not obtaining the desired position.

(2) The official who makes use of knowledge which he is bound to keep secret can fail against commutative justice if he sells this secret to others. For example, the mayor of a city knows officially that a piece of property in the suburbs will soon be much more valuable because a school is to be built in the vicinity. Accordingly, for a consideration he transmits this information to a real estate company which will buy the property from the present owners for much less than they would soon receive for it. In this case the executive co-operated in a sin against commutative

[6] Cf. Merkelbach, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, n. 636.

justice toward the present owners. It is true Vermeersch doubts this statement, apparently on the ground that the owners receive a just price as far as present values are concerned, and have no strict right to the greater price which the property will soon be worth.[7] However, he seems to have overlooked the fact that it is an act of injustice to deprive a person of something, even if he has no strict right to it, if unjust means are used.[8] Now, in the present instance the means employed to deprive the owners of a chance of a higher price are unjust—the unlawful manifestation of an official secret. In the words of Tanquerey, referring to public officials who are guilty of a violation of their trust in this manner: "They misuse their public function and unjustly favor themselves or others, to the detriment of a third party."[9] It would follow that the official who sells a secret whereby profit accrues to the buyer of property is bound to recompense those who were induced to sell the property by the recipients of the "tip." His obligation depends on the failure of the profiteers to restore. If they restore to the original owners, he should restore to them the bribe; if they do not, he himself must make restitution to the original owners. Naturally, the sum he would have to pay would exceed the amount of the bribe. Perhaps some theologians would question this solution. At any event, even in the most generous theological interpretation of the transaction, it is hard to see how the official can be allowed to keep the bribe, since he acquired it without a just title.

Some theologians believe that an officeholder who uses official information regarding the approaching modification of the value of property for a *personal* transaction (for example, if the mayor in the case given above bought the property for himself) does no wrong.[10] Tanquerey considers this a disputed point.[11] Accordingly, an official who would act thus could not be obliged to restitution, at least if no positive law forbade him to participate in such a deal. But no one can fail to see that such a mode of action would be far from honorable.

[7] Cf. Vermeersch, *Theologia Moralis* (Bruges, 1928), II, 462.

[8] Cf. Merkelbach, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, n. 291.

[9] Tanquerey, *Synopsis Theologiae Moralis* (Tournai, 1936), Vol. III, n. 737.

[10] Cf. Wouters, *Manuale Theologiae Moralis* (Bruges, 1932), I, 603.

[11] Cf. Tanquerey, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, n. 737.

(3) It stands to reason that the purloining of property owned by the government is a violation of commutative justice. Apparently there are some officeholders who entertain the naive idea that public property is *res nullius*, which they may lawfully acquire if they can get possession of it, somewhat after the manner of treasure trove. Some forms of this kind of graft are so direct that it is impossible for anyone possessing the basic concepts of right and wrong to perpetrate them with a clear conscience. For example, when the budget is padded with fictitious expenses to cover the money which the officials have appropriated, or when the salary list sent to the treasurer contains the names of individuals who have been dead for years (or who never existed), or when unnecessary jobs are created for the benefit of henchmen, it is a matter of unvarnished theft. And even the dullest intellect should be able to see that the money is being stolen from the taxpayers.

However, other forms of this type of graft are more indirect. Thus, when a civil administrator gives a contract for public work to a company and in return demands (explicitly or implicitly) a share of the profits, he is undoubtedly failing against commutative justice. Ordinarily the injustice would be done to the government. For, in the majority of cases the contractor will add to his bill a sufficient amount to cover the sum of the graft; and in this supposition the graft would have to be returned to the public treasury. In the presumption that the bill was not padded, the restitution would be due to the contractor, since this would be a case of extortion, forced payment for a service that should be rendered freely, such as was discussed above under (1).

Under the same classification of tapping the public funds comes the case of the officeholder who sends workmen, in the employ of city or state, to repair or to paint his house. A similar type of theft takes place when articles that have been used in public buildings and still have considerable money value, but are now being supplanted by new material—such as typewriters, rugs, clocks—are transferred to the homes of the officials. The use of the stationery and the stamps provided for public business constitutes a sin against justice when directed to the personal benefit of the officeholders, at least when it takes place on a large scale. Of course, neglect of the duties for which a public

official is being paid is a violation of commutative justice. And, to close this litany of thievery (which is by no means exhaustive), there are officials who spend the public funds wastefully with the purpose of winning favor and votes from the beneficiaries among the citizens.

(4) A public official who takes graft for an intangible good which *per se* can be granted only by society, but which the beneficiary willingly pays for, would seem to commit a sin against commutative justice. Thus, a police officer abstains from arresting a traffic violator, receiving in return a sum of money. Actually the officer has sold something which only the law can grant—immunity from arrest and from the burden of standing trial. Or, to put it another way, the policeman has infringed for personal gain on a right which belongs to the state—the right to indict the culprit and (supposing a conviction) to punish him. Add to this the fact that the policeman by virtue of his office is bound to protect this right of the state. It is true, there is no obligation in justice binding the official to recompense the state for the fine which (probably) would have been imposed on the offender, for the state receives a strict right to the fine only through the sentence of the judge.[12] But the official has enriched himself by a transfer of something he had no right to sell; and it would seem that his case is analogous to that of the man who steals and sells a tangible piece of public property, like an automobile belonging to the city. The first duty of the public servant who sells immunity is to restore the bribe and make the arrest, if this is still possible; if not, he must turn over to the public treasury the money he acquired by encroaching on the rights of the law. The same principle would apply to the judge in a criminal trial who accepts a bribe to acquit a man whom he knows to be guilty. Ordinarily it would be impossible to bring this criminal to trial again; hence, ordinarily the judge must make restitution to the government.[13]

The agreement by which a public official enriches himself by a neglect of his duty, as in the cases just given, may appear to some

[12] Cf. Merkelbach, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, n. 316.

[13] If a judge, through bribery, renders an unjust sentence in a civil suit, he is guilty of a violation of commutative justice toward the loser. The way, *per se*, to the restoration of justice is for the winner to surrender his unjust gain to the loser, and for the judge to restore the bribe to the one who gave it.

as the *contractus turpis*, in discussing which theologians say that the money may be kept by the person who fulfilled the stipulated evil deed.[14] However this difference must be noted: In the fulfillment of the ordinary *contractus turpis* there is no infringement on the rights of a third party. Thus, the prostitute who has been paid for the commission of sin may keep the money if she has performed the act demanded; for in the fulfillment of her bargain she has not deprived a third party of any right. But if a *contractus turpis* involves a violation of a strict right of a third party—for example, if a watchman accepts a bribe to permit a thief to ransack a house which the watchman is obligated to guard—restitution to the injured party is demanded. In the case of the deliquent official considered above, the right of society which has been violated is of the moral order; nevertheless, both parties to the unjust agreement considered it as something worth money. Accordingly, if the violation of the right cannot be repaired (by the recall of the immunity and the bringing of the offender to trial or to punishment), the money for which that right was exchanged should be given as restitution to the public treasury.

* * * * *

The view that commutative justice is violated in the cases of political graft treated above (and in other cases of substantially the same nature) may appear to some readers to be over-strict. Yet, the conclusions that have been proposed seem to follow logically from accepted principles of Catholic theology. The practical consequence is that public officeholders who have profited in the various ways described in this article are bound to relinquish their ill-gotten gain by restoring it to the injured parties—either private individuals or the state, as the case may be. When the rights of private individuals have been violated and it is subsequently impossible to make restitution to these individuals themselves (or to their heirs), the unjust gain must be turned over to the poor or to pious causes. Illicit profit at the expense of the government is *per se* to be restored to the public

---

But, if the winner will not restore, the judge must recompense the loser for his loss, which would mean the giving up of a greater sum than he had received through bribery.

[14] Cf. Merkelbach, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, n. 465.

treasury. We say *per se*, because it not infrequently happens that there are sufficient reasons for restoring to the poor or to pious causes money or property stolen from the government.

One who cannot make restitution at present because of insufficient means may, of course, defer the fulfillment of this obligation until he can make payment. This principle can be applied also to the man who could make restitution at present only by greatly reducing his family in the economic scale and perhaps even by drawing down ridicule and contempt on himself and those dear to him. But it should be remembered that one who is unable to fulfil his entire obligation at once must retrench his living expenses so that he can satisfy his indebtedness gradually.

As was previously noted, it is quite possible for a public official to engage in certain forms of dishonesty without realizing that he is failing against commutative justice. He thus becomes what is known as a possessor in good faith. When he becomes aware of his obligation to restore, he must give back whatever is left, really or equivalently, of the unjustly acquired money. But in the event that he has spent the money, and is now no richer than he would have been had he not acquired it, he is bound to no restitution. Furthermore, there are occasions when a confessor is justified in allowing a penitent to remain in good faith on some point of justice—either the sinfulness of a practice to which he is addicted or the obligation to make restitution for past transgressions. However, this will rarely happen in the case of a public official who is habitually enriching himself by graft; for the scandal caused the faithful when they see a man who is commonly recognized as a dishonest politician regularly approaching the sacraments will impose on the priest the obligation of enlightening him as regards his duty, even though he is apparently unaware of the immorality of his conduct.[15]

Priests should also deem it their duty to give frequent and detailed sermons and instructions on the obligations of those in posts of civil trust and responsibility. When consulted by such persons, a priest must not hesitate to explain in their full consistency and practical application the principles of Catholic

[15] Cf. St. Alphonsus, *Theologia Moralis* (ed. Gaudé, Rome, 1909), Bk. VI, n. 615; IV, p. 640.

theology on commutative justice and the obligation of restitution after a violation of this virtue. Priests must be careful not to give even an appearance of favor toward politicians publicly known to be violating these principles—for example, by inviting them to speak at a Communion breakfast or a Holy Name rally. On the contrary, the priest shall make it quite clear that a man cannot at the same time be a dishonest politician and a practical Catholic—even though he may loudly proclaim his loyalty to the Church and give generously to works of Catholic charity.

The world is in a sad condition today, one of the chief reasons being that there are many men in public life who prefer their own selfish interests to the public welfare. Catholics should lead the way to reform, because they have the advantage of being instructed in moral principles by the one true Church. In the United States, where graft is so common a feature of public life, Catholic officials must be disabused of the idea that dishonesty is permissible to them "because everybody is doing it." Even if it were true that everybody else is doing it, Catholics would have to be different. The law of God as expounded by the Catholic Church is unchangeable and universal; it does not lapse just because it is extensively transgressed. Our fellow-citizens are sorely in need of upright men who will guide and direct the affairs of government sincerely and honestly. In the vanguard of those who will supply this need should be those Catholics who have been elected or appointed to the dignity and the responsibility of public office.

FRANCIS J. CONNELL, C.SS.R.

The Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

CHRISTIAN WISDOM

Whence, dearly beloved, the integral teaching of the Christian wisdom consists not in abundance of words nor in cleverness of disputation nor in the desire for praise and glory, but in the true and voluntary humility which in all fortitude the Lord Jesus Christ chose and taught from the womb of His mother to the torment of the Cross.

—St. Leo the Great, Sermon 37, 3.

THE GREAT FOOTNOTE MYSTERY

The following article is of absolutely no practical value to the busy priest, and if he reads it he will only be wasting his time. It is about footnotes, and if there exists a more uninteresting topic, I am unable to think of it at the moment.

The current impression seems to be that the reading public is allergic to footnotes. Now this may or may not be true. I have, among my acquaintances, a few people who read books—even some who read *The American Ecclesiastical Review*. But I have never yet seen one run screaming from the room because he had detected a hapless author in the act of sneaking a footnote into his book or magazine article.

Still, many publishers, when putting out English translations of books which are, perhaps, classics or semi-classics in their original languages, persist in cutting the footnotes to an absolute minimum, often retaining the less important ones, and, with unerring instinct, tossing those which are really vital into the waste-basket. Sometimes, probably with the idea that the sight of a footnote leering up from the bottom of a page will frighten away a prospective buyer, they place them (the footnotes, not the buyers) in the back of the book—thereby deluding the purchaser and at the same time placating the anguished author. Probably an even more insidious practice is the location of the footnotes at the end of each chapter. In either case, some carping critics maintain, the cure is much worse than the disease.

Perhaps we shall even come to the point where we find advertised, as the principal merit of a book, the fact that there are no footnotes in it. We may even find a publisher who promises, after the fashion of some shoe manufacturers who advertise a reward for anyone who finds paper used in their shoes, a prize for the detector of a footnote.

It didn't strike me until I reread the last sentence that there is a natural connection anyway between shoes and footnotes. (This isn't much of a joke, I admit; but perhaps it's nearer to one than *The American Ecclesiastical Review* usually condescends to approach—barring misprints, of course.)

The foregoing statements could have been documented with much libelous naming of names. But this would necessitate foot-

notes, and since the Anti-footnote League may be right after all, I may as well play it safe and leave the footnotes out.

Of course I realize that if I leave out footnotes, the editors of *The American Ecclesiastical Review* will most likely leave out my article. It is a notorious fact that the Board of Editors of the *Ecclesiastical* is a group of stern, silent men, occupied at all times with profound thoughts on the most esoteric, speculative, and unintelligible subjects; and that their editorial meetings are conducted in a funereal hush broken only by low growls of "*Not enough footnotes!*" as manuscripts are cascaded into the wire basket marked "Return to author—when we get around to it."

The problem is this: can a book or an article be written featly without footnotes? (Sorry) Well, an author can put all his references into the text itself, something like this: "As Eusebius remarks on page 335 of the first volume of his *Ecclesiastical History*, translated by Kirsopp Lake, D.D., D. Litt., Winn Professor of ecclesiastical history in the University of Harvard, published in London by William Heinemann and in New York by G. Putnam's Sons in 1936, 'Further testimony to these events is given by Melito, the famous bishop of the church in Sardis...'" This method has a distinct advantage that will recommend it to all authors. The type in the text is larger than the type used in footnotes; therefore it takes up more space; therefore the book will be bigger; therefore the publisher will be able to charge more for it without being too obviously a bandit; and therefore the author will receive larger royalties.

Or, the author can go a step further in this matter of footnotes, and leave out all references. This method has even more to recommend it. Once an author writes a book or an article on a serious subject, with no footnotes explicit or implicit, I doubt if he will ever use one again. He will recall with a pang the golden hours of his youth wasted in checking sources and verifying quotations so as to be fairly sure of what he was talking about. If he leaves out all footnotes, no grubby pedant will ever be able to check up on him, and he can quote (and crib) from Ignatius of Antioch to Connell of Brookland with a gay, uninhibited sense of security.

Still another reason can be found for leaving out all footnotes. There still exist, I fear, readers anxious to know whether the author is basing his argument on sound authorities—perhaps they

may even desire to inquire more closely into the subject and are looking for an indication of the sources. These readers will actually look at the footnotes if there are any to look at. *But such men are dangerous, impractical dreamers, and must be discouraged whatever the cost.*

All in all, I think even the editors of the *Ecclesiastical* will admit that the case against footnotes is a strong one; that to write without footnotes is really quite a feat.

Probably, though, it would be better not to abandon all footnotes immediately. I know of one publication—since there are no footnotes to this article I don't have to admit that I don't remember which one it was, having received this information third hand—which reached an interesting compromise. All the footnotes were omitted, but the superscript numerals referring to them were retained in the text. Perhaps this is the answer to the problem.

I have only one reservation to make, and I am quite proud of it since any sort of reservation is hard to make these days. It is a well-known fact that one of the purest joys in this vale of tears is the warm, comfortable feeling that comes to a reader who opens a book containing seven thousand eight hundred and ninety-six footnotes and says to himself: "After all, you don't need to read any of them if you don't want to, you know!" Should we deprive a whole generation of readers of that innocent pleasure? This is a serious argument in favor of footnotes.

So serious is it, in fact, that I think I shall wind up this article with a footnote numeral after all.[1]

EDMOND DARVIL BENARD

The Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

[1] Don't bother looking for the footnote, though.

MISSION INTENTION

"The Arabic nations where Mohammedanism arose" is the Mission Intention for the month of March, 1945.

EDUCATION FOR THE MISSIONS

The following pages are intended to advance a tentative and provisional solution to a problem that is of deep concern to all the seminaries of the country. That problem is the necessity of adequately preparing our future priests to meet their full missionary responsibility. The extent of that obligation becomes clearer day by day. Unless our leaders are completely misled, and all the normal signs by which the future may be forseen are altogether deceptive, the Church in America is soon to be required to carry a much heavier portion of the Catholic mission burden than ever before. If we are to rise to the historic opportunity that obviously will soon be ours, then the mission formation of the faithful must be seriously undertaken. Because of the position of leadership enjoyed by the clergy, no work, however admirable or necessary, will really succeed unless they give it whole-hearted support. Consequently, it is imperative that our seminarians become completely mission-minded, so that they in due time may impart to the people the fulness of the mission spirit.

One of the most extensive programs for the accomplishment of this purpose is the Missionary Academia for Seminaries instituted by the Society for the Propagation of the Faith. This plan endeavors to enlist the voluntary and devoted co-operation of seminarians for the study of the principles of mission method and the mission history of the Church. To aid in the preparation of papers to be read and discussed by the students, brochures are written by competent authorities, and are issued regularly throughout the school year. The Catholic Students' Mission Crusade, in its material prepared for Seminary Units of that organization, is also making a substantial contribution to the mission training of our future priests.

Despite the fact that the crowded seminary curriculum leaves little room for additional studies, some of our seminaries have introduced formal courses in Missiology. Many of the leading seminaries of Europe before the war had instituted this study, usually at the postgraduate level. But the subject is of such vital importance that faculties have been concerned to find a place for it in our own theological schools. Along with some

others, the Paulist Fathers have endeavored to meet this need, and have established a course in Missiology in their major seminary, St. Paul's College, at The Catholic University of America in Washington. This brief resumé of the course is offered with diffidence because it is still in the experimental stage. But the topic itself is of such surpassing urgency that it is well deserving of widespread reflection, prudent experiment and fruitful discussion.

The course here discussed covers the four years of theology, for one period a week, supplemented by a carefully supervised reading list. The number of class periods might easily be expanded, but other necessary studies would thereby suffer. In order to balance the theoretical with the practical phases of the subject, it was decided to divide the course into four categories, corresponding to the four-year course in theology: (1) The Principles of Mission Method; (2) The Psychology of Conversion; (3) Missionary Catechetics; and (4) Missionary Homiletics.

The American priest, in the active ministry, has a stake in the missions not unlike that of the Paulist. First, he must be completely convinced of the need of America's maximum contribution to the foreign missions, must give generous co-operation to those societies that specialize in this blessed work, and must inspire and instruct the laity with regard to their obligations in this matter. Secondly, he is obliged by his very priesthood and by the condition of religion in his own land to be every inch a missioner himself. He cannot forget that a huge portion of the total mission problem of the Church exists here in America. We have not converted our own country. We live in a land where one hundred million souls are still deprived of the full enjoyment of Christ's truth and grace. The twofold aspect of the mission problem as it relates to the clergy of our country seemed to justify this division of the subject matter.

Perhaps the first year's concern with the principles of mission method may seem to some to be of mere academic interest. It is extremely unfortunate that the whole notion of Missiology is thought to be an over-refinement, or one more instance of the excessive specialization so characteristic of our time. In reality, it is the attempt to reduce to a cohesive theory and to fundamental principles the norms that guided the intelligent zeal of the great missionaries of the Church. Unless the clergy have an

acquaintance with these basic axioms they will lack comprehension of the problems and aims of our missioners abroad, and their instructions to the people will be superficial, or based on merely sentimental grounds. And the missions deserve and require much more than that. Besides, a lack of familarity with these principles will seriously handicap the clergy in the convert apostolate in which they themselves must engage.

There is no art, profession, or occupation that does not have its basic principles, its fundamental precepts and its insistent caveats. Good craftsmanship in any realm is always a joy, and its results are invariably superior to those of the untrained dabbler. Many people play the piano by ear, but they are seldom permitted to exercise their dubious virtuosity on the concert-going public. There is some form of apprenticeship in every occupation during which a man learns to do his job. The experiences of the pathfinders are invaluable; they reveal the methods that achieve success, the causes of failures, remedies for faults, short-cuts, and a host of details that are treasured by workers in any given field. Unless each worker is to break new ground perpetually and to repeat the errors of his predecessors, he must learn the rudiments of his trade or art. However distasteful to the slothful, it is axiomatic that good practice follows upon good theory. Football games are not won merely on the gridiron nor military victories on the field of battle. The roots of these achievements, in no small measure, lie in the chalk talks of an athletic coach and in the lecture hall of the Army War College. Aptitude and genius may lessen the rigors of training, but never dispense with learning the fundamental principles of any craft.

All this would be fairly obvious if it were not so often ignored with regard to the mission apostolate of the Church. It goes without saying that conversion is ultimately the work of divine grace. No human wisdom or cultivated talent or superior technique will ever, of themselves, produce the act of faith. Nevertheless, God has invited man to co-operate with Him in the building of His Kingdom. Though it is God alone who gives the increase, He ordinarily requires Pauls to plant and Apollos to cultivate the field. Since God has enlisted our energies in preparing souls for His graces and in the distribution of His gifts, we are inexcusable when we permit our contribution to fall short of our very best effort.

The Church has been engaged in missionary labor since the first Pentecost. This effort has been continuously blessed by the action of the Holy Spirit. But even humanly speaking, her sons have learned much concerning the best methods of approaching the various types of men and nations still outside the fold. Whenever their achievements and the directives that made them possible are ignored, this indifference is reflected in disappointing results. We cannot bestow the gift of faith, but we can put obstacles in the way of its reception.

Hitherto, it was Europe that supplied most of the energy, the men and the financial support for the missions of the world. But Europe is prostrate and will need aid herself in the rehabilitation of the Church within her many devastated lands. It is to America that the world will look for much of the vocations, the financial aid, and the prayer that will be needed. We will be expected to capitalize on the measure of solidarity that survives the animosities of the war and to implement our zeal with the inventions that scientific ingenuity has placed in our hands. The measure of the heroism, practical judgment and natural resources America contributed to the Allied war effort is some indication of the contribution American Catholics will be asked to make towards the Christianization of the world.

It is with these facts in mind that the lectures and assigned reading in the first year of the course under discussion are arranged. A partial list embraces the following topics: The Importance of Mission Method; The American Priest and the World Mission Problem; The Scriptural Basis for the Missions; The Doctrinal Basis for the Missions; The Mission Authority in the Church; Portrait of a Missioner; The Wise Disposal of Mission Forces; The Objective of the Missionary; The Principle of Accomodation; Missiography; Practical Charity and the Missions; The Method and Achievement of St. Paul, St. Patrick, St. Boniface, St. Francis de Sales; The Jesuits in the West; The Jesuits in the East; The Franciscan Missions; The Dominican Missions; American Mission Movements; The Paulists; Maryknoll; and The Church Extension Society.

Source material for this year's work includes, in part, the volumes of Joseph Schmidlin; *Catholic Mission Theory* and *Catholic Mission History;* the works of Père Charles; and the studies of the Missionary Academia. The alert student is quick

to discover valuable material in current periodicals, such as Gustav Voss's excellent treatment of missionary accomodation in *Theological Studies* for December, 1943, and Joseph Clifford Fenton's article, "The Reason for Catholic Missions," in *The American Ecclesiastical Review* for December, 1944.

The student who has busied himself with the technique of the missionary heroes knows that while they developed an excellent strategy for wide areas, they did not neglect a good tactical plan for smaller localities and for the conversion of individual classes and persons. This, then, leads naturally to a consideration of the psychology of conversion. No group of men realizes so well as the Catholic clergy the importance of practical psychology in dealing with souls. Yet it may well be doubted whether this realization extends, as often as it should, to their association with non-Catholics. A priest may be patient with inebriates, tactful with those in marital difficulties and sympathetic with those who struggle with strong passion; yet the same man may be less understanding with our separated brethren.

Most men come to the priesthood from thoroughly Catholic surroundings. Unlike St. Paul, St. Augustine, and Newman, they have no personal experience of the long and arduous journey that ordinarily must be traversed before a man arrives at the truth. The certainty and security of the faith becomes second nature with us. The totality of Catholic truth may seem so obviously beautiful and patently true to us that we may have little patience with those who never enjoyed our advantages or who are slow to appreciate and accept them. This is not due to any neglect of the theological factors involved but to our failure to allow sufficiently for the psychological factors at work in the process of conversion.

A physician may know much about the signs, the causes, the probable direction, and the remedy for various diseases without having suffered personally from these same ailments. A priest can perfect himself in the art of spiritual direction though he need not have experienced in his own life all the difficulties encountered by his penitents. So the convert-maker, by study, reflection, reading, and experience may develop facility in helping souls on their journey to the Church. In order to assist the seminarian to gain the insight, the sympathy, the ability in patient diagnosis, and the wise application of spiritual remedies for his future in-

quirers, the lectures of the second year are concerned with the following topics: Elements for and against the Spread of Catholicism in the United States; The Meaning of the Phrase "Separated Brethren"; Are non-Catholics Sincere?; The Necessity of Tact; Apologetics: Irenic and Polemic; The Role of the Priest; The Role of the Laity; A Parochial Plan for Convert-Making; Specialized Techniques for Convert-Making; The Necessity of Grace; The Necessity of Prayer and Sacrifice; Stages in Conversion: The Initial Attraction, Growing Appreciation of the Church, On the Threshold; Reception of Converts; Those Who Cannot Be Received; Helping the Convert Adjust Himself; The Potential Influence of Converts; Helps to Conversion: Zeal, Good Example, Preaching, Literature, Converts Through Marriage, The Return to Religion; Hindrances to Conversion: Ignorance, Sin, Scandal, Fear, Human Respect; Confidence.

The reading list in connection with this year's work is concerned mainly with the lives of converts. Our converts, in their enthusiasm for their new-found faith, have produced a literature remarkable for its clarity and cogency. It is of invaluable aid to those who are outside the Church. But it is also a treasure for the Catholic who would increase his competence in dealing with inquirers, because of its frankness and psychological insight. Here, as nowhere else, we can witness the working of divine grace in leading souls from error to truth. And since we are apt to be better acquainted with God's dealings with sinners than with those in error, this literature is for us of inestimable value. In it we are able to see the variety of influences at work, the difficulties that beset souls, and the reasons or arguments that produced clarification and ultimate conviction. These books are unequal in value, and some are better left unread until the student is more mature. But, in general, the better the seminarian knows this literature, the greater the competence he will later command in the delicate work of convert-making. As the physician knows famous case histories, the lawyer the past litigation that bears on his current problem, and the soldier the significant battles and campaigns of the past, so the convert-maker should be deeply read in the literature of conversion.

Some of the more informative and revealing of the books recommended are the following: *The Confessions of St. Augustine;* Newman's *Apologia;* Maisie Ward's *Gilbert Keith Chesterton; The*

Catholic Church and Conversion, by G. K. Chesterton; *After Fifty Years*, by Vassall-Phillips; *The Price of Unity*, by B. W. Maturin, along with Maisie Ward's *Father Maturin: A Memoir; Restoration*, by Ross Hoffman; *Salve Mater* and *Reveries of a Hermit*, by Frederick Joseph Kinsman; *Fast by the Road* by John Moody; *Through Hundred Gates*, by Severin and Stephen Lamping. One could scarcely omit the record of the spiritual pilgrimages of Robert Hugh Benson, Ronald Knox, and Arnold Lunn.

Since the second century the Catechumenate has been the technique found most successful in attracting and instructing non-Catholics. The mission center of the Maryknoller in the Orient and the convert center of the Brooklyn Apostolate are both adaptations of a venerable and still vigorous institution. A knowledge of its technicalities will not merely assist the clergy in understanding one of the chief tasks of the foreign missioners, but will also present him with a method for convert-making at home. The third year's work, therefore, concentrates on the details of organizing the parochial convert class and on the instruction of converts. The task of facilitating the instruction of non-Catholics presents problems that are substantially different from catechizing the faithful. It requires ingenuity to attract non-Catholics; they do not accept the Church's teaching authority; and they are often ignorant of the simplest concepts of Christianity. These considerations more than justify the need for special coaching of the clerical student for this work.

A vast work of preparation is being made for the missionary of tomorrow. The growing recognition of the essential solidarity of men, fear of what horrors another war may bring, appreciation of many of the universal values of Catholicism, the prestige of the Pope, the devotion of Catholic missioners and chaplains—all this may hold rich promise for the missioner. And at home, many a non-Catholic has been shaken by tragic circumstances and his latent religion has been stirred to activity. Even before the war, there were men of good will in every parish who, for one reason or another and in varying degrees, were attracted to the Church. But, unfortunately, there was seldom any organized parochial method in operation to deepen their interest and to facilitate their instruction. Their incipient interest or profound concern was never improved simply because they were obliged to make the first advances.

In this third year of the course in Missiology, the student is taught to put aside human respect and to assume the initiative. He is instructed in the ways of making it generally known that Catholics are eager to explain their faith, and that they are willing to welcome non-Catholics to individual or to class instruction. He learns to gauge the sentiments of the people of his locality and the peculiar circumstances of their life and work. He is helped to survey the best means of forming an inquiry class, and to employ the various means of publicity, of enlisting the aid of the clergy, religious, and laity, and the organizing of a crusade of prayer for the apostolate.

He then examines the method of classifying his inquirers, insofar as this is possible. He considers the mentality, background, and the specific difficulties presented by the agnostic, the unbeliever, and the various types of Protestants. The aim is to enable him to anticipate their problems and to be familiar with the area of common ground between their present position and that of Catholicism.

The pedagogical problem, or Catechetics as it relates to non-Catholics, naturally looms large this year. It is becoming increasingly clear that the seminary course in theology does not in itself guarantee that a priest will be an effective preacher or catechist. Concerning this point the writer recommends a careful reading of two illuminating articles by John Courtney Murray, S.J., entitled "Towards a Theology for the Layman" in *Theological Studies* for March and September, 1944. One of the principal contentions of the writer is that scholastic theology is mainly concerned with the study of God as He is in Himself, whereas Sacred Scripture is mainly concerned with God and His meaning for us. The preacher and the catechist, therefore, must take the conclusions of theology and employ them after the method followed in Scripture. The theologian starts where the truth is, so to speak, whereas the catechist must start where people are. If this is true of the instruction of Catholics, it is even more necessary in the instruction of our separated brethren.

With this in mind, the third year student takes the *Catechism for Inquirers*, by Joseph I. Malloy, C.S.P., and studies it chapter by chapter. He is guided in answering the following questions with regard to each chapter: What spiritual need of humanity does this doctrine satisfy? What question or problem of humanity

does this teaching answer? What degree of preparation does the man of today possess for understanding this doctrine? What are the common misconceptions of the various types of inquirers with regard to this dogma of the Church? Assigned reading during this year comprises books on the art of the catechist and those on Catholic doctrine and apologetics. Constant stress is placed on the importance of adequate instruction; the need for a positive, pacific explanation of the truth; the strength of the difficulties that cloud men's minds; and something of the universal satisfaction that comes to him who helps a soul from hostility or timid admiration on to the public profession of faith.

Many elements are needed to make the missionary, but he is above all a preacher of the glad tidings of the Gospel. Not all the great missionaries were "pulpit orators," though some of them were distinguished in this respect; but all of them were very effective speakers and achieved much of their success through the medium of the pulpit. It seemed wise, therefore, to devote one year of the course to the details of missionary homiletics.

It might be well to mention that the Paulist student has had an advanced course in composition during his two years of philosophy. He has taken, as well, a course in voice culture and public speaking, and has been writing and delivering short sermons during his first three years of theology. He is now assisted in the art of preparing and delivering the full-length sermons and lectures which will occupy so large a part of his public ministry. Lectures and reading during the fourth year concentrate on the principles of sermon construction and delivery; on the technique of the Catholic Mission, preaching to non-Catholics, the retreat, and the occasional sermon. And much time is devoted to the delivery of sermons and individual coaching in connection with them.

The priest in the United States must endeavor to reach both Catholics and non-Catholics. If our Catholic people are to discharge their full obligation to the unconverted world, they must be instructed, inspired, and led. In them must be fostered the mission spirit, so that they too will become missionaries within the limits of their station in life. They should have a love of the faith, and such a grasp of its details as will help them give compelling reasons for their belief. They need to be acquainted with Catholic doctrinal and moral principles so as to bring them to bear on the solution of problems that perplex the men of our

time. They must know that the level of Catholic life among the laity is one of the most influential factors in winning friends for the Church. They must realize the necessity of utilizing their talents and capitalizing on their contacts in order that they may perform those preliminary tasks of charity that precede and prepare non-Catholics for formal instruction.

The Catholic pulpit must win the attention of non-Catholics as well. They are separated from the Church more through ignorance of her teaching than for any other single cause. Their ignorance must be removed, their prejudices corrected, and their need of the eternal truth satisfied. Non-Catholics sometimes attend our services, but if the mission spirit moves our Catholic people, this will be a much more frequent occurrence. All this will deserve a standard of preaching that measures up to the best traditions of the Catholic pulpit.

The seminarian ought to be taught to think in terms of the pulpit, to be alert for good sermon material, and how best to utilize his knowledge and experience in the cause of truth. The average seminarian is not halting and inarticulate when discussing any matter on which he is informed and concerning which he has a deep conviction. But, in preaching, he sometimes becomes stilted, remote, and uses a language that few Catholic laymen and almost no non-Catholic can comprehend. A sermon is too often for him a literary composition, a theological treatise, or merely an assignment to be fulfilled. Less frequently is it a vital message for needy souls born of the revelation of Christ. Actually the seminarian has had an admirable preparation for the pulpit. He now possesses a deeper and more accurate knowledge of the dogmatic and moral teaching of the Church; his spiritual reading, meditation, and spiritual direction have enabled him to penetrate into the merciful designs of God; and his efforts at self-mastery have given him personal experience with human weakness. If he has investigated the mentality and the needs of non-Catholics, and the means of reaching them, his understanding of their plight has deepened and his sympathies have been enlarged. The problem is to tap this knowledge and experience and to make it available for souls.

An effort to accomplish this purpose is attempted in a seminar for fourth year students which precedes the preparation of their sermons. A vital sermon topic is announced to the class. One

student examines the dictionary for the precise meaning of the term. Another consults *Roget's Thesaurus* for cognate words and phrases associated with the subject. This is done to attain clearer comprehension and facility in communicating this understanding. Besides, we wish to convince the student that words are a stimulant to reflection, and suggest fruitful trains of thought. A third student pursues the germinal idea in the Concordance, while others locate these references in Sacred Scripture.

The instructor endeavors to stir the thought process of the students with a view to eliciting their personal knowledge and experience concerning the theme, and discovering the ways in which this relates to the needs of the people. Almost every student makes some contribution. One after another, they recall, either from reading or actual life, applications, illustrations, causes, remedies, hindrances, and a variety of aspects of the theme that are unearthed by the discussion. Usually, an abundance of material is suggested and is then sifted and classified. A mimeographed outline is given to each student, along with a list of references for source material. However, most of the students had been reminded of some phase of the subject which becomes the spur to their personal approach to the theme. They then carry this idea around with them for a few days, jotting down the applications and unsuspected relations that later occur to them. They then write and are ready to deliver the finished sermon.

The task of preparing our future priests for the problems and opportunities of a new day is no easy one. But it seems clear that their duty will call for apostolic zeal as well as administrative ability. The course outlined is an attempt to solve the problem within the limits imposed by the other demands of the seminary curriculum. Pius XI once said that, in our time, no one had a right to be mediocre. This is, indeed, a time for true greatness. If the potential talent and generosity of our clerical students is wisely directed and if the mission spirit is imparted to them, then their future contribution to Christ's cause will not be unworthy of the hopes of the Church and the needs of the world.

JOHN T. MCGINN, C.S.P.

St. Paul's College,
Washington, D. C.

CONTARDO FERRINI

Though the sanctity of every servant of God, of every Christian for that matter, is fundamentally the same (founded on the life of grace and the virtue of love) there is immense diversity of sanctity; and saint differs from saint as star from star in its glory. Each saint must bear the distinctive impress of his own peculiar vocation, his social and educational background, the atmosphere and temper of the age in which he lived, and the circle in which he moved. The life of every saint must reveal the personal natural traits of disposition and character, for grace does not destroy but elevates and sanctifies.[1] By divine design the sanctity of the Church is manifested in the most diverse types of holiness, never separated from the distinctively human though it is truly divine. Hermit or soldier, king or priest, workman or scholar: all may be raised to heights of holiness. The Catholicity of the Church is nowhere more evident than in this catholicity of sanctity, in this divinization of all that is human.

The interest manifested by the late Sovereign Pontiffs, by members of the hierarchy in Italy, and numberless lay people in the advancement of the cause of Contardo Ferrini emboldens the writer of this article to essay a study on the peculiar holiness of this great Servant of God. Those who best knew Ferrini both admired and loved him. They looked upon him as a saint. Pius XI spoke of him with such terms of admiration and affection as to startle those who knew the calm and unruffled Achille Ratti. He spoke of "splendid science, marvellous talent, Christian piety of rare solidity and profundity"; was proud of the sincere and profound friendship between Ferrini and himself. Mingling a certain amusement with reverence, Benedict XV called him the "Saint in Frock Coat." Pius X (not without irony) expressed himself as exceedingly anxious to promote the canonization of a saint who was a professor at a university.[2]

[1] "Cum enim gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat, oportet quod naturalis ratio subserviat fidei; sicut et naturalis inclinatio voluntatis obsequitur charitati." *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 1, art. 8, ad 2.

[2] Cf. Msgr. Carlo Pellegrini, *La Vita del prof. Contardo Ferrini*, (Turin: Societa Editrice Internazionale), pp. 593, 663 ff.

A detailed account of the life of Ferrini would carry us beyond the scope of our article. A brief summation must suffice. He was an Italian lay professor, outstanding specialist in Roman Law. His life extends over the second half of the nineteenth century, from 1859 to 1902. Endowed with prodigious memory, fertile imagination, clear intelligence, he was trained at home and abroad for his professorial and literary vocation. His professorial activity in the field of Roman Law at various universities in Italy and his enormous literary output in the same field of endeavor shed luster upon himself and his country. The extraordinary merit of his spiritual writings links him with the author of the *Imitation* and with Saint Francis de Sales.[3]

The life of such a man is lived apart from the crowd, and is unexciting, uneventful by standards of press or radio. The quiet of libraries and lecture rooms is its arena, rather than the hurried mart of business or the agitated forum of politics. Even academic controversy is kept within narrow confines. Add to this a disposition modest and shy, and we have all the ingredients of the unnoticed life — the life of the secluded professor who lives and dies without a single headline.

Nevertheless, this modest and reserved student attracted attention wherever he went. Personal charm contributed much; extraordinary learning created interest even among the unlettered. But we think it is rather the contrast between the man and his surroundings, between the man and his age, the need that men had for him and his message, a need which the story of his sanctity still helps to satisfy—we think it is this which makes Contardo an object of interest. And we have reason to believe that interest in him and his life will grow as the years pass. Distance and time, which change the stature of men and events will, we feel, be partial to him. As other great of his age grow small, he will loom large as one of the few really great men of the century.

A model of intellectual and moral greatness, he was a leader and guide in the limited political activity possible in the Italy of

[3] Cf. *Scritti religiosi di Contardo Ferrini*, 3rd ed. (Turin: Societa Editrice Internazionale). Note especially the Letter of Introduction by Carlo Dalmazio Minoretti, Bishop of Crema.

his time.[4] By popular election he was made a member of the city council of Milan. He was an associate of the Instituto Lombardo of science and letters, a defender of the rights of the Church and of Christian morals in the face of anti-clerical socialism. His very presence at the universities as professor and scholar seemed like an anachronism. The German Mommsen, who certainly entertained no Catholic bias, said of him: "Through merit of Ferrini the primacy of Romanist studies passed from Germany to Italy." [5] That a man of such "quality" should profess his faith openly and practice it heroically was very like a miracle; in fact Pius XI looked upon him as "almost a miracle." The radical socialistic, materialistic, atheistic attitude of the age was best expressed by a youth, a certain Gemelli, who would occasionally attend a lecture of Ferrini's for sheer amusement "over a university professor who at the beginning of the twentieth century still believed in God." (It is the story of this same Gemelli which illustrates the influence of Ferrini, for in the Providence of God we think that Ferrini was the "Stephen" to this modern "Saul." Later Gemelli became Father Gemelli, rector of the University of the Sacred Heart, Postulator of the cause of Contardo Ferrini.)[6]

The sharp contrast between Ferrini and his age should give us the clue to the peculiar sanctity which makes him a parable for our own age. Ferrini exemplified the synthesis which we find in the saints. Profound faith is linked with high achievement in science; exaltation of mind with moral stature; the best of nature with the sublimest of super-nature; exterior activity, practical and effective, with an interior life profound and mystical; mastery of human mission with conquest of eternal destiny. This harmony and synthesis in an age which divorced science and faith, intellect and morals, material and spiritual! The synthesis

[4] Only long after the death of Ferrini were the Catholics of Italy permitted to participate freely in the political activity of their country. The violent suppression of papal temporal authority in the Papal States and the anti-clerical policy of the government left the Church no other recourse but complete restriction of any political activity on the part of Catholics. Only gradually, as conditions improved, were the restrictions lifted. Finally, during the pontificate of Benedict XV, the Popular Party under Catholic influence became a great power for good in the public life.

[5] Cf. Pellegrini, *op. cit.*, p. 468.

[6] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 433; cf. also Pio Bondioli, *Per la storia d'una grande idea*, (Milan: Unione Tipografica, 1928).

was not precariously tended in the cloister or sanctuary, but in the arena of science in a modern university. As though by a divine irony, this man presented to an age which no longer believed either in chastity or in miracles, the moral miracle of a chaste and virginal life in the midst of moral corruption. Ferrini consecrated his life by a vow of perpetual chastity.[7]

A Mexican prelate, Bishop Martinez, auxiliary in the See of Michoacan, seems to have caught best the spirit and vocation of Ferrini's sanctity:

> It seems to me that the profound interest which is aroused by Ferrini in all who know him arises from the fact that he is a saint in our epoch; and thereby we are made to realize vividly and profoundly the artistic contrast between the divine and human, which forms the esthetic value of every type of sanctity, and which bears the authentic seal of Christ. . . . .
>
> One of the distinctive characteristics of genuine sanctity and particularly of heroic sanctity is the marvellous balance and unity of virtues which seem mutually exclusive, but which when united form most beautiful contrasts. To be humble and magnanimous, simple and prudent, is a thing truly prodigious, attained only by true saints under the impulse of the Holy Spirit, Who, being Infinite Love, imprints on souls which He fills the seal of the divine unity.[8]

The prelate then adds that he finds in Ferrini three such contrasts in an "enchanting color of actuality": joy and austerity, science and faith, laborious intellectual life and intense interior life.

From a vastly different source comes corroboration of the bishop's testimony. One of Contardo's pupils, Gino Segre, a Jew, says of his beloved professor: "He made no mystery of his religious and political opinions; he was a man of convictions, of most sincere faith. His religious zeal was as far removed from intolerance as it was alien to foolish prejudice. I exclude absolutely that his assidious observance of religious practices could be derived from religious mania: a profound conviction inspired and guided the acts of his life."[9]

Professor Pietro Bonfante extolls the harmony of the man of science whom we admire and the man of virtue whom we must

[7] Cf. Pellegrini, *op. cit.*, pp. 185 f.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 593.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 214 f.

imitate; in Ferrini we have one who is "truly exemplary, a perfect model, harmoniously combining the moral and scientific."[10] Similarly Monsignor Duchesne: "He magnificently united sanctity of life and purity of faith with the scientific demands of exalted teaching."[11]

In every servant of God, in fact in every Christian, the relation between the exterior life and the interior spirit is the basis for our understanding of his peculiar sanctity. There are saints whose repudiation of the world consists in fleeing from it altogether. Theirs is the vocation of the hermit and contemplative. There are others, both in the world and in the cloister, who show an abhorrence for all bodily things. Their attitude toward their family and relatives seems harsh, their subjection of the body almost cruel. We can understand them only in the light of their particular mission and their age. But we must not lay ourselves open to the error of condemning even the severe bodily castigation as a species of Manichean excess. Its rightful purpose can be only the submission of the whole man to God, the external leading to, assisting, and expressing the inner mortification of the will. In some instances there is no other means of crushing the rebellion of the flesh and of banning insubordination of mind and will and preparing the way for higher prayer and contemplation. Self-mastery in great temptation often finds no other adequate means. In no instance, however, can bodily mortification stand alone or be performed for its own sake. Linked with inner mortification and performed in accordance with one's true vocation, it is very meritorious in itself and as an example to others.

It is interesting to note that certain great saints did not practice extreme bodily mortification. The reason, I think, is twofold. So complete was the harmony of inner and outer activity, of the natural and super-natural; so great was the control and use of natural gifts in the service of divine grace that without great exterior mortification the inner submission of the will to God was achieved. Moreover, the life and vocation of these servants of God was such that it demanded a different kind of penance.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 232.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 235, in a letter to the Holy Father urging the introduction of the cause of Contardo Ferrini.

Such a saint was Thomas Aquinas[12] by contrast with the founder of his order, St. Dominic. It seems to us that Ferrini is much like the Angelic Doctor in this particular.

There is also a striking difference. Thomas was immersed in the sublimest of thought in his daily teaching and writing. Almost spontaneously, he could ascend from the theme of lecture discussion to the very heights of contemplation, for he taught and wrote about divine things.[13] How different is the case with Ferrini! Ancient manuscripts on Roman Law are far removed from contemplation and the mystic states; and the academic discussions in the university today are hardly conducive to living in the Divine Presence and cultivating the inner life; and the polemics arising from anti-clerical socialism readily disturb the spirit of prayer and meditation.

Only the peculiar grace of his vocation would enable Ferrini to reconcile such antinomies. Only this grace explains how, in the midst of multiple duties (he complains that he has scarcely time to eat), he could live in the world's intellectual and moral corruption, its hectic hurry, its disregard of the spirit, its political and academic disturbance, and yet retain the perfect balance of exterior and interior life. And this peculiar grace must account for the fact that—in accordance with his vocation—he did not resort, as did Dominic and Suso, to extreme scourging and bodily castigation.[14] So deep and solid was his interior life, so sanctified was the human by the divine, the natural by the supernatural, that he could truthfully be said to have attained the loftiest heights of human personality—heroic sanctity.

The finest exemplification of our point is found in Ferrini's love of nature. His biographer says:

> Groups from Suna or the surrounding country would often seek him out as a guide for mountain climbs. He readily acceded to such requests, for mountain climbing was the only attraction which could draw him away even briefly from his work. He was reliable, pleasant, informative. The mountain scenes awakened his enthusiasm and he sought to make a climb up the Alps both instructive for the mind and elevating spiritually. On the trips he would discuss geology, glaciers,

[12] Cf. L. H. Petitot, O.P., *San Tommaso D'Aquino* (Turin: Marietti, 1924), pp. 87 ff.

[13] Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 91, 105.

[14] Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 88, 92.

flora and fauna; and interlard his talks with literary allusions from Greek, Latin, and German poets, or from Dante, Parini, Carducci, Zanella, and Porta. He would offer bits of hygienic advice, caution against eating certain mountain berries or drinking from the freshets or fountains.[15]

The sublimity of nature would turn his thoughts to God. His spirits would rise and he would invite his companions to glorify God through His works; "he was the poet of nature and God." Perfect correctness of deportment did not carry with it awkward and unnatural demeanor: he could unbend, enjoy the conversation of the group about the points of interest, the little occurrences of the day, and he was not at all adverse to a pleasant joke.

We mention these trivia because it seems to us that a saint shows himself very truly in his moments of recreation and relaxation. In the less guarded, less serious, less studied actions the true man is revealed. If he is unaffected, pleasant, enjoyable, he shows forth not only the true spirit of joy of sanctity, but even greater self-discipline. Far from an abnormal and Manichean fear of God's nature, of the pleasant things of life, he spontaneously uses all things lawful and directs them to God. The "painful piety" of the novice or beginner on the way of perfection reminds one of the affected speech and demeanor of the "new arrival."

Ferrini himself gives us many clues to his own inner life and the harmony of the exterior and interior. They help us to understand his friendly spirit, his graciousness, his apostolate of gentleness, his humor. They help us to understand how he could accomplish his human and earthly tasks and yet attain heroic sanctity: the synthesis of the earthly mission and the conquest of the eternal. Holy men have often feared that even the mission to perform holy acts, such as those of preaching and administering the sacraments might prove a danger to their own perfection. They feared that they themselves might become castaways, though they had led others to salvation.

Ferrini sanctified even the study of Roman Law, because he saw Christ in everything and sought to transform all into Christ. He seeks to merge all his life, all his work into Christ. This he

[15] Cf. Pellegrini, *op. cit.*, pp. 482 f.

does by profound Eucharistic love: "What happiness for a soul which loves the truth to receive the truth itself; which tends toward happiness to make itself happy in joy itself; which desires the good to unite itself to infinite perfection! Receiving this Sacrament we die with Him to the world and to ourselves, whence we rise with Him." He calls the desire for union with Christ and assimilation with Him the secret of holiness: "With that drink," he says of the chalice of the Precious Blood, "we unite intimately with God, we become one with our Father and we become divine, we become one with God." In the Eucharist Ferrini found the source of his power, the soul and center of the harmony of his life, the secret of making all science the handmaiden of divine truth, and all activity the servant of holy works.

We fondly hope that this holy jurist will soon be raised to the Church's altars in order that his sanctity continue its instructive mission on earth, especially in the circles of the learned. Speaking of him, as we have in this article, as a saint, as heroic, as called by divine vocation, we do not wish to anticipate the decision of the Church. But we have been encouraged to use such terms by the great and spontaneous devotion to him shortly after his death and by the very words of bishops and popes. We hope that in the trials facing Catholic Italy in the near future there may be inspiration in the life of Contardo Ferrini.

EDWIN G. KAISER, C.PP.S.

St. Joseph's College,
Collegeville, Ind.

CARDINAL ELIA DALLA COSTA TO HIS FLORENTINE CLERGY

We tell our people, fight for the salvation of your soul, and are we going to do nothing in order to save our own? If a lay person cannot be saved without prayer, will a priest be saved without it? If the gate is narrow for the lay person, will it be wide for us? It has been said that none shall be crowned except he strife lawfully, shall we pretend that having a stole, a chasuble, a mitre we have the mark of predestination? No, we are not merely Christians, we are priests, that is, teachers and a teacher will not be saved unless he teaches; we are apostles and the apostle will not be saved unless he preaches by both his word and example.

—Card. Elia dalla Costa, *Esortazioni al Clero*, p. 67.

ON THE PROBLEM OF CO-OPERATION
SOME CLARIFICATIONS

The article by Fr. Paul Hanly Furfey, "Intercredal Cooperation: Its Limitations,"[1] may have occasioned some false impressions in the minds of readers unfamiliar with my own writings, and with those of Fr. Wilfrid Parsons, S.J., on this subject.[2] Hitherto, I have not found time to offer the necessary corrections; it may be still worthwhile to do so, for the sake of the record.

Fr. Furfey's central contention is that we have argued, on the basis of papal documents, for "a very particular kind of co-operation"; his criticism is chiefly directed against my formulation of certain of its features. He undertakes to show that our particular kind of co-operation has no basis in papal documents; that it is, in fact, discouraged by one (*Singulari quadam*) and ridiculed by another (*Notre charge*). For my part, I feel that he has bypassed certain structural elements in Fr. Parsons' case for co-operation. He has also revealed certain fundamental misunderstandings of my own position.

These misunderstandings are the more puzzling, because it is their second appearance. They first appeared in a letter to the Editor of *Theological Studies* in September, 1943. At the time,

[1] *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, CXI (1944), 161-75, parenthetical page-references in my text are to this article.

[2] "Christian Co-operation," *Theological Studies*, III (1942), 413-31; "Co-operation: Some Further Views," *ibid.*, IV (1943), 100-11; "Intercredal Co-operation: Its Theory and Organization," *ibid.*, 257-86 (to be cited as, "Theory, p. etc."); exchange of letters with Fr. Furfey, *ibid.*, 467-72; *Intercredal Co-operation*, Papers by Wilfrid Parsons, S.J., and John Courtney Murray, S.J. (Catholic Association for International Peace, 1943); *The Pattern for Peace and the Papal Peace Program*, by John Courtney Murray, S.J., and the Ethics Committee (Catholic Association for International Peace, 1944); these last two pamphlets will be cited respectively as "*CAIP*, 1943," and "*CAIP*, 1944"; the last-named, though published in the summer of 1944, was written in the fall of 1943 and circulated privately as part of the backgound material of the Pattern for Peace; parts of it were published in various diocesan papers. I may note here that objection has here and there been taken to the term, "*intercredal* co-operation." It was my own coinage, *faute de mieux;* in order to avoid verbal disputes, I no longer use the term; if anyone can find a better term, we could agree to adopt it.

I felt (1) that Fr. Furfey had failed to grasp my position in the matter of *organizing* co-operation among men of good will in the work of justice which is peace; (2) that he had missed the point of my use of *Singulari quadam*, and imputed to me a fallacy which I had carefully avoided; (3) that in his own argumentation from *Notre charge* he had fallen into the very fallacy which he thought to find in my use of *Singulari quadam;* (4) that by his allegation of the case of *Le Sillon* he had confused the issue involved in my proposal of common agreement between Catholics and non-Catholics on the natural religious and moral bases of social order. At the time, however, I thought it sufficient simply to offer some seminal considerations that would assist in clearing up these misunderstandings. Since they have reappeared, and taken on more developed form, perhaps a more pointed reply is indicated. If I seem to sharpen its point, I trust that it will be understood that I am simply seeking clarity; my remarks are surely not edged against the person of a very able and zealous man.

ORGANIZATIONAL UNITY

First, let us review my position with regard to organizing co-operation. Fr. Furfey says: "Father Murray, if I read him rightly, proposes that Catholics should take the initiative in founding *an* organization, at once spiritual and interconfessional, devoted to social reform" [in the context, a single organization with mixed membership, like *le plus grand Sillon*] (p. 171). The word "*an*" in italics (mine) signalizes the first misunderstanding. Replying to Fr. Furfey over a year ago, I stated that I favored no such single "super-organization",[3] the same statement is found elsewhere.[4] Moreover, my original utterances should have been sufficient in themselves to preclude this interpretation of my position.

When dealing with the problem of organization, I carefully distinguished two questions; "(1) Should the co-operation be

[3] ". . . in the United States I do not think a single organization with mixed membership would be practicable or advisable . . . ." (*Theol. Stud.*, IV [1943], 474).

[4] "In the case of the Christian Trade Unions in Germany at the beginning of the century, this principle [fusion of men of different faiths in a single organization] was, under certain safeguards, 'tolerated and permitted.' But its use seems hardly possible or prudent in the American scene at the moment." (*CAIP*, 1943, p. 37).

organized? (2) What should be the organizational form?"[5] The premise of the distinction was the fact that, in dealing with practical matters into which considerations of practical prudence enter, the Holy See normally issues only generalized directives. It does not substitute itself for the authority of local Ordinaries, nor for the legitimate, concrete initiatives of Catholics under their Ordinaries. I pointed out the operation of this principle in connection with *Singulari quadam*.[6] In the light of it, I distinguished the *quaestio facti* and the *quaestio modi*. And my position was threefold: (1) The Holy See has directed that co-operation be organized; (2) it has not specified the particular formula for its organization; (3) it has, however, issued certain generalized directives that must preside over local solutions to the problem of organization.

My case for the first assertion was based (1) remotely, on the papal texts that describe today's spiritual crisis in the temporal order,[7] and (2) proximately, on the texts that formally invite co-operation. These latter texts call for two things: (a) for "unity" and "collaboration" among all men of good will towards the establishment of a new order based on the moral law, and (b) for a unity and collaboration that will be socially effective—that will actually get this new order constructed, not just dreamed about or described on paper. From these latter texts I concluded to the sheer fact that co-operation must take on some organized form. Supporting this conclusion was a principle to which I merely alluded, stating that there was "no need to belabor" it; for the principle is absolutely fundamental in Pius XI's social thought, and is explicit and implicit in everything he ever said about social justice or Catholic Action. I mean the principle that "action for social organization must be social and organized in its principle." Perhaps I should have belabored the point. As a matter of fact, I suspect that one of the basic issues between Fr.

[5] "Theory," p. 262.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 269.

[7] These texts led me to say that the unity between Catholics and all men of good will was to be "religio-civic," because they were to collaborate in a spiritual task (the establishment of the social order on its natural religious and moral bases), whose purposes, however, remained entirely within the temporal order; this unity, therefore, is specifically different from the unity pursued by Protestant ecumenism in all its forms.

Furfey and myself (and between Fr. Furfey and Fr. Parsons) is not whether, or how, co-operation should be organized, but rather, whether social action in general must of its essence be organized action.[8] This is not the place to go into the question;[9] but I cannot forbear the respectful suggestion that the distinguished advocate of "the technique of non-participation" and of "personalist social action" has not fully weighed the import of this papal principle.

At all events, this principle buttresses my statement that a papal directive falls upon the establishment of "an organizational unity" among all men of good will. No merely casual coincidence of practical programs—what Fr. Furfey once called, in a difficult if not contradictory phrase, "parallel co-operation"—will satisfy the papal texts;[10] still less will it achieve the papal objective, the actual construction of a new order. Since I was staying within the limits of the *quaestio facti*, it did not occur to me that my phrase, "organizational unity," would be misunderstood to imply a particular mode of organization, a single superorganization. I deliberately chose a generalized term to express the generalized papal directive. Organizational unity can be achieved according to many variant formulas—federation, fusion, varieties of each. Therefore, in advocating it, I still left completely open the *quaestio modi*: how shall this unity be organized? Furthermore, in taking up this second question, I did not promise to find a con-

[8] This impression results from a study of Fr. Furfey's books, *Fire on the Earth*, *Three Theories of Society*, and *A History of Social Thought;* it results especially from consideration of his preferred methods of social reform—the two methods that he calls "the technique of non-participation," and "personalist social action" (cf. *Fire on the Earth*, pp. 117 ff.; pp. 92-97; *Three Theories*, pp. 217-21; *History*, pp. 403-405). I suggest that the root of Fr. Furfey's lack of sympathy with organized co-operation can probably be found in his rather individual theories of a "supernatural sociology," and of a "pistic society." He says, for instance: "Institutions, after all, are built by individuals, and reflect the spirit of the latter." This is only a half-truth. Institutions are built by individuals only inasmuch as individuals act formally as members of a group. No individual, and no mere aggregate of individuals can create a social institution; the sole proportionate cause of this effect is the action of a solidary group. This is a commonplace of Pius XI's theory of Catholic Action; it is at the root of his insistence that Catholic Action is an organization.

[9] Cf. W. Ferree, S.M., *The Act of Social Justice* (Washington: The Catholic University of America, 1943), chaps. III, IV, V.

[10] *Theol. Stud.*, IV (1943), 468-69.

crete answer, immediately applicable to the United States, in any papal texts. I did, however, look for generalized directives that should preside over local solutions. And I found them in Pius X's *Singulari quadam*.

SINGULARI QUADAM

In discussing this document, Fr. Furfey again misses the point of my use of it. As once before, he mistakenly constructs my thought: "So on this one occasion [Christian Trade Unions in Germany] the Church permitted intercredal co-operation of this particular sort [Catholic participation in a single interconfessional organization] . . . . But to argue that the Holy See encourages this sort of intercredal co-operation is as rash as to argue that mixed marriages are encouraged by the Church" from the fact that they are permitted in particular cases (pp. 169-70). Here there is an awkward tangle of misconceptions. First, as stated already, I was not arguing for a single interconfessional organization; secondly, I was not arguing that the Holy See encouraged that form of organized co-operation; thirdly, I was not really arguing at all, for anything. I was simply seeking to see what *Singulari quadam* had to offer in the way of generalized directives on the question of modes of organizing co-operation. My one effort was to "study its complete doctrine."[11] And I found that the beautifully balanced thought of Pius X was controlled by two major principles: (1) a pastoral concern for the unity of the Church, which prompted a warning against the dangers of interconfessionalism; and (2) a social concern for the common good, and for Catholic effectiveness in pursuing it, which prompted a permission to adapt organizational methods to the needs of particular social contexts. The balance of these two principles dictated the practical provisions of the Letter.

I think I gave full weight and space to the first of Pius X's principles. But I felt that the second principle should receive its

[11] "Theory," p. 263. Fr. Furfey (p. 170) seems to attach a hidden significance to the fact that my original long discussion of *Singulari quadam* was not included in *CAIP*, 1943. Actually, the single reason for its omission was the judgment—made by others, and reluctantly consented to by myself—that the discussion was too academic for a popular pamphlet. This same reason explains the omission of the analogy (not the "parallel," as Fr. Furfey calls it) between Catholic Action and organized co-operation between Catholics and non-Catholics, which appeared in the original article.

own due emphasis, against the one-sided views of those who tend to consider solely the dangers to faith that co-operation entails. These are real enough; Pius X considered them most seriously. But he also most seriously considered the dangers to the common good entailed in not co-operating, and in not organizing co-operation in the way judged locally more effective for the common good. His concern for the common good led to the permission of the interconfessional Christian Trade Unions, an ideally less desirable organizational form. However, my essential point was not the fact of the permission, nor even the kind of organization permitted, but rather the reason for the permission. It was given "in view of the peculiar situation of Catholicism in Germany." In giving it, therefore, the Holy See recognized that the exigencies of the common good in a concrete religious and social context (exigencies powerfully urged by the Cologne School) are to be kept in view in deciding on local modes of organizing co-operation. This, in sum, is what I found to be the "complete doctrine" of *Singulari quadam*. This is all I tried to "prove" from the document—the existence of a twofold papal directive, generalized in character, for the solution of our *quaestio modi*. My insistence was on the fact that the directive is twofold, not single. And my only "conclusion" was this: "The conclusion is that Catholic concern for the common good must bulk large in any discussion of intercredal co-operation."[12]

So much for my own use of *Singulari quadam*; what of Fr. Furfey's use of it? Frankly, I find him unhistorical, incomplete, and tendentious. First, he says that Pius X regarded the Christian Trade Unions as a "dangerous venture," a "dangerous experiment." There is a lapse of historical memory here. The first Christian Trade Union was founded in 1894; *Singulari quadam* was issued in 1912. By that time, Christian Trade Unions were far from being a "venture" or an "experiment"; they were a widespread, immensely successful, going concern, whose value for the labor movement had been proved. As for their dangerousness, let us not blow it up too high; else we shall make Pius X, and Leo XIII, too, look rather lax in their pastoral solicitude. Leo XIII had reigned eight years, and Pius X nine years, before the papal warning against these dangers, of which Fr. Furfey makes

[12] "Theory," p. 272.

so much, was finally uttered. Finally, let us remember that in the historical circumstances the Pope's intervention in the Berlin-Cologne dispute was rather in defence, than in disapproval, of Cologne. Great pressure had been exerted by important bishops for a condemnation of the Cologne formula, and of the *Sozialpolitik* behind it. In the end, after being long badgered, Pius X came out, not with a condemnation, but with a carefully phrased approval of the Christian Trade Unions.

Secondly, Fr. Furfey tends to reduce the whole doctrine of *Singulari quadam* to a papal warning against the dangers of Catholic co-operation with non-Catholics. I myself recorded this element of its content. But that interpretation is incomplete which would make this element, however important, the sole element. My suggestion has always been that the sole issue in this whole matter is not whether co-operation is dangerous. Everybody admits that it may be; although it is significant that Pius XII has never given any warning about dangers in his very particular type of co-operation (which is mine, too).

Thirdly, of the words in which Pius X gave his reason for tolerating and permitting the Christian Trade Unions, so long as they are "advantageous and lawful"[13] ("respicientes peculiarem rei catholicae in Germania rationem"), Fr. Furfey says: "These words obviously imply a warning against generalizing this permission and toleration for application in other countries." The implications of the remark are tendentious. First, nobody was attempting to generalize the permission itself. My point was that the reason for the permission is entirely capable of generalization. And the words in question with equal obviousness

[13] Fr. Furfey implies that Pius X permitted the Christian Trade Unions on the principle that "the Church can be flexible and permit one evil to avoid a greater one" (p. 169). This statement is quite unwarranted; confer the explanation ("Theory," p. 268, note 12; quoting Mausbach) of the positive implications of "et permitti" added to "tolerari posse"; the Pope declared that there is something better, but not that the Christian Trade Unions were an "evil." Moreover, he stated that their toleration and permission were "opportuna" and "justa," advantageous in the circumstances, and lawful (*AAS*, IV [1912], 660), and he forbade accusations against the faith of those who "recto consilio volunt de Syndicatibus mistis esse et sunt" (*ibid.*, pp. 661-62). Finally, in the passage in *Quadragesimo anno* in which the prescriptions of *Singulari quadam* are renewed there is no suggestion that such mixed syndicates are an "evil."

imply that, if the same *peculiaris rei catholicae ratio* were to be verified elsewhere, the same permission might well be forthcoming, on the same principle—concern for the common good. At this junction, I am forcibly reminded of Fr. Furfey's own acute observation: "It would seem that some Catholic thinkers read the encyclicals with a particular attitude of mind" (p. 174). The observation returns to mind with even greater force on reading Fr. Furfey's interpretation of *Notre charge*.

NOTRE CHARGE

Fr. Furfey's palmary argument is drawn from this document; he considers it "of prime importance for the criticism of the type" of co-operation which I contemplate (p. 170). Actually, I omitted it because it is quite irrelevant to the type of co-operation I have in mind. The omission was not, as Fr. Furfey says, "strange." What is really strange is his manner of employing the document. He might have taken the opportunity to do with *Notre charge* what I at least tried to do with *Singulari quadam;* he might have studied its complete doctrine against its background—the fascinating history of a splendid Catholic movement gone wrong (as someone has pointed out) because it did not grasp the true relations between the natural and the supernatural order. So far as the question at issue goes, the results would have been negative; but the study itself would have been interesting. At all events, instead of adopting this constructive historical approach, Fr. Furfey simply takes two texts from *Notre charge* and with them scores what looks very much like a debater's triumph. I am hoist on a syllogism: Pius X "ridicules" an "interconfessional organization founded by Catholics to work for the reform of civilization;" but this "seems to be precisely what Father Murray proposes;" therefore, Pius X ridicules my proposal! The debate is then closed: ". . . further discussion," says Fr. Furfey, "is unnecessary" (p. 171).

But has not the gavel descended prematurely? It is rare that discussions are closed by syllogisms that have four terms. I really should be granted a shot at that minor, and at the major, too. Of course, to carry on the discussion at all, even on the plane of dialectics, I shall have to grant Fr. Furfey's mistaken supposition—that I did actually propose *an* interconfessional organization

for the reform of civilization (since these are alphabetic days, let us call it Fr. Murray's IORC). For the sake of argument, I am not unwilling to do so. As a matter of fact, I could design on paper an IORC whose constitution and bylaws would not offend against any point of Catholic doctrine or law; and there would be no trouble about it, unless I were rash enough to try to get my IORC off paper into some particular diocese, without the bishop's leave. At all events, we can rig a basis for discussion. What is bothering Fr. Furfey at this stage of his argument is my proposal of interconfessional agreement on certain necessary religious and moral bases of a just social order. I did make the proposal, and I have sketched summarily the content of the agreement—four truths of the natural order, and their social consequences, largely as drawn out by Pius XII in his Christmas Allocutions.[14] Let us, for the sake of the argument, add the missing element, a single organization of mixed membership, that will operate on the common ground of this agreement. By this process we have the basis for our argument—a full-fledged, rip-roaring (on paper) IORC. So be it.

But I am still not impaled on Fr. Furfey's syllogism; for the IORC that I have proposed is not at all like the IORC that Pius X ridiculed. From the standpoint of its characterizing feature—the interconfessional agreement on which it operates—it is about as much like *Le Sillon* as Pius XII is like M. Sangnier. Consequently, in the syllogism in question, a double supposition is given to the term, IORC. (Truly an embarrassing situation for a syllogism to find itself in.) But before analyzing this double supposition, there is a preliminary point.

I cannot forbear pointing out how Fr. Furfey has fallen into the same fallacy that he sought to find in me. He said, in effect: "Using *Singulari quadam*, Fr. Murray argued from a papal toleration and permission given to the Christian Trade Unions to a papal toleration and permission as available for the big super-organization he has in mind [I didn't have it in mind, of course]. But this is no way to argue; you are generalizing a permission given in one particular case, and making it cover another case." I shall grant that this is not a good argument; rather fortunately, it was not my argument. Now, in return, I should be allowed my

[14] Cf. *CAIP*, 1944, pp. 11-13; *Theol. Stud.* IV (1943), 472.

fling at dialectics. I say: "Fr. Furfey argues from the papal ridicule of *Le Sillon* to papal ridicule as undoubtedly forthcoming for my IORC. But this is no way to argue; you are generalizing a condemnation issued in one particular case, and making it cover another case." On his own showing, Fr. Furfey should admit that the argument is no good; unfortunately, it is his argument.

To have made it stick, he would have had to do one of two things. First, leaving his syllogism in its present form, he could have attempted to prove that my IORC (I am still putting myself in the false position of having to defend that child of the imagination) is a case exactly parallel to that of *Le Sillon*. If the cases are exactly parallel, my poor IORC would fall under the condemnation levelled against *Le Sillon*; the syllogism would work. To establish the parallelism would require more than the citation of two texts. One would have to outline the complete content of *Notre charge*, faithfully portraying *Le Sillon* as it is there portrayed, ridiculed, and condemned. One would have to state the radically erroneous religious and social philosophy of *Le Sillon*, the chimerical nature of the reform of civilization which it proposed, the falseness of its political ideal, its enfeoffment to an unsound political party, its refractory attitude towards ecclesiastical authority, its boast of being "above the Church" and of possessing a higher life than hers, the injurious effects of its educative effort, its necessarily undermining effect on the faith of its Catholic members (not because they had to subscribe to "something less" than the full Catholic doctrine, but because they supported doctrines in direct contradiction to Catholic faith and sound social theory).

Having outlined all this, one would have to go on to what is minor in *Notre charge*, *Le Sillon's* interconfessionalism (to it are devoted five of the Letter's twenty-seven pages). One would show that it was *Le Sillon's* radically false religious, philosophical, and social tenets that led it (in its third phase, from 1906 onwards) to issue its "summons to the construction of the future city of all workers from every religion and every sect."[15] One would state, too, that its summons was issued to atheists, freethinkers,

[15] *AAS*, II (1910), 624. For a brief history of *Le Sillon*, cf. Moon, *The Labor Problem and the Social Catholic Movement in France* (New York, 1921), pp. 375-82.

and agnostics as well. And above all, one would expose *Le Sillon's* concept of the common ground on which this heterogeneous crowd would meet, and from which they would draw adequate inspiration for their social tasks—what M. Sangnier called "a generous idealism." Having thus faithfully reproduced Pius X's description of *Le Sillon*, which in its totality gave the reason for his condemnation of the organization, one would then have to go on to show how all these features of *Le Sillon*—and especially its very particular brand of interconfessionalism—are verified in my IORC (whose religious and social philosophy, program of reform, etc., are contained in Pius XII's Christmas Allocutions!). The cases would thus be demonstrably parallel; and the remorseless logic of Fr. Furfey's syllogism would smite me forever silent. I am not surprised that Fr. Furfey did not choose to take this line of proof.

But there is another line. One could generalize the major of the syllogism, to make it read: In *Notre charge*, Pius X ridicules the idea of any and every kind of IORC, no matter what its brand of interconfessionalism, no matter what its objectives, no matter what set of principles underlies its call for co-operation among men of different religious beliefs. In other words, one could undertake to prove from *Notre charge* that interconfessional co-operative action as such—by the sheer, unqualified fact of its interconfessionalism—is a ridiculous means of working for social reform. In that case, my IORC would again be condemned, no matter how it differed from *Le Sillon*.

This, of course, would be a risky procedure. For one thing, it would bring Pius X squarely into contradiction with himself. After all, he did not ridicule, nor was he even "delicately ironical" with, the Christian Trade Unions, which were indubitably IORC's. On the contrary, he spoke of them with reserve indeed, but with great respect; and he tolerated and permitted them as advantageous and lawful in their own concrete situation. Nevertheless, this second line of argumentation seems to be the one chosen by Fr. Furfey. Apparently, he wants to find in *Notre charge* a general principle that will make all interconfessional organizations—of whatever inspiration and kind—ridiculous, or, at least, the object of delicate papal irony.

His proof seems to be that in *Notre charge*, "Pope Pius took occasion to point out the inevitable undesirable features involved

in this type of intercredal co-operation" (p. 170). One main, inevitable, undesirable, vitiating feature is signalized: "such organizations overlook or implicitly deny that only on the basis of the full Catholic social teaching can society be saved." This fact, says Fr. Furfey, is what "moves Pius X to be delicately ironical" about *Le Sillon's* pretensions; this, so far as Fr. Furfey's context goes, is the main reason for his condemnation of the organization. My previous respectful suggestion that the whole business was not quite so simple is brushed aside as "beside the point." I am confronted with one text that I shall not be able to "explain away," and that contains, supposedly, delicate papal irony against all interconfessional organizations of whatever shape, manner, kind, inspiration, basis, or objective: "Behold an interconfessional association founded by Catholics to work for the reform of civilization—a work that is in the first place religious; for there is no true civilization without moral civilization, and there is no true moral civilization without the true religion."[16]

At this point, it becomes necessary to lay aside all the dialectics, and to get down to some sound interpretation of papal documents. I am not interested in "explaining away" texts; but I do like to have them situated in their contexts before anybody starts to argue from them. Let us, therefore, follow this recognized procedure with the text in question.

Pius X said: "Behold an interconfessional association founded by Catholics to work for the reform of civilization . . . ." In the context he was talking about *Le Sillon*, and about *Le Sillon* alone: "Voici une . . . ." We are invited to behold a particular, definite one. He goes on: ". . . a work that is in the first place religious, etc." This is irony. And it is directed singly against *Le Sillon*. Why the irony? Because the Pope has just devoted seventeen pages to showing that *les Sillonistes* have no concept of the right religious and moral bases of society, that their whole theory of man and his social nature, and of the Church, too, is vitiated by radical errors. Hence he asks ironically: How shall these men, and their associates of all religious beliefs (and of none), who share their erroneous views, operate the reform of society, "a work which is in the first place religious," and which therefore supposes right religious and moral principles for its achievement?

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 625; cf. Furfey, p. 170.

From the context it is clear that the Pope disqualifies *Le Sillon* as an agency of social reform, not precisely because it is interconfessional, but because its interconfessionalism is linked with a false religious, moral, and social philosopy.

This becomes even clearer from what follows. The Pope goes on to state the principle that "practical achievements [in the social sphere] assume the character of the religious convictions" that inspire them. This leads him to examine "la profession de foi du nouveau comité démocratique d'action sociale." He quotes M. Sangnier's words on opening membership in *le plus grand Sillon* "to all men 'who are respectful of religious and moral forces, and who are convinced that no social emancipation is possible without the leaven of a *generous idealism*.' "[17] The italics are in the text; they signalize the Pope's discovery of what he is chiefly looking for—the basis of *Le Sillon's* interconfessionalism and of its co-operative program. On this he turns the power, not of a delicate irony but of a savage sarcasm, as he proceeds to develop the immense disparity between the task these men have

[17] *AAS*, II (1910), 626. It is in this context that Fr. Furfey's second triumphant text occurs: "What is to be thought of a Catholic who, on entering his study circle, leaves his Catholicism at the door, in order not to horrify his companions . . . ." Again Fr. Furfey fails to note the qualification given to the remark by its context. The study circles of *Le Sillon* were thoroughly secularized; worse than that, they were foyers in which and from which radically false ideas were disseminated. One of the paradoxes of *Le Sillon* was this: at the same time that it identified "Christianity" with "democracy" (according to its own false understanding of these terms), it put a complete separation between religion and politics. Consequently, with absolute literalness, the *Silloniste* left his Catholicism at the door on entering his study circle, and professed allegiance to a "higher religious way of life," *Le Sillon* itself. Is this the same as meeting non-Catholics on the ground of the natural law in its social applications? And is it not quite tendentious to lift Pius X's remark out of its context, and hurl it at the latter, altogether different procedure? Furthermore, let us be concrete: when three Catholic priests (myself included) entered the study circle from which the Pattern for Peace emerged, none of us checked at the door anything but his hat. Moreover, any number of points of Catholic doctrine were brought squarely into the discussion. Finally, I have always insisted that a major advantage of well-managed co-operative endeavor is that the intelligent Catholic has abundant opportunities for illuminating non-Catholics in many matters of our faith. Frankly, Fr. Furfey's use of this text smacks faintly of "smartness," that emerges even in the translation of the French, "*laisse* son catholicisme à la porte," by, "*checks* his Catholicism at the door." On religion and politics in *Le Sillon*, cf. *Etudes*, CXXIII (1910), 678-85.

assumed—the reform of civilization—and the pitifully inadequate means wherewith they hope to achieve it, "the sharing in common of a generous idealism."

Notice that this sarcasm is directed, not against the abstract idea of co-operation among men of different faiths towards social reform, nor even against co-operation on the basis of something less than the full Catholic social doctrine, nor against the organizational formula of *Le Sillon*, but solely against a co-operation inspired by the common sharing of a lot of false ideas, which dictated false social objectives. The Pope is castigating the "audacity and levity of mind of men who call themselves Catholics, and who dream of establishing, over and above the Catholic Church, 'the reign of justice and love,' with the aid of workers who come from all sides—men of all religions and of no religion, men with beliefs and without beliefs—provided that they forget what divides them (their religious and moral convictions) and put in common what unites them, a *generous idealism* [italics in text] and moral forces gathered *où ils peuvent.*"[18] Co-operation on such a basis and for such objectives, says Pius X, is of no avail for the reform of civilization: "What is going to come forth from this sort of collaboration? A purely verbal and chimerical structure, in which one will see crazily shining in seductive confusion the words liberty, justice, fraternity and love, human equality and the exaltation of man—the whole thing based on a misunderstanding of the dignity of man."[19] The sentence deliberately reproduces the enthusiastic but confused quality of *Silloniste* utterance.

Yet, with all this, the Pope has not yet reached the most profound vice of *Le Sillon*, and the radical reason for his condemnation of its particular brand of co-operation. Fundamentally, he says, this co-operation is aimed at the establishment of "a religion (for *Le Sillon*, its leaders say, is a religion) more universal than the Catholic Church, uniting all men, at last become brothers and comrades, in 'the reign of God.' "[20] In other words, the aims of *Le Sillon's* co-operative action did not remain within the temporal order nor stop at merely social reform. This co-

[18] *AAS*, II (1910), 627.

[19] *Loc. cit.*

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 628.

operative movement has a specifically ecclesiastical finality; it aimed at the establishment of a new Church. Its vice was not simple interconfessionalism, but downright anti-Catholicism. It had become, the Pope says, "a miserable tributary of the great movement of apostasy, organized in all countries for the establishment of a universal Church without dogmas or hierarchy, without rule for mind or rein for passion."[21] *Le Sillon* was, in effect, a counter-religion, and it was condemned as such.

I tried once before gently to suggest something of this to Fr. Furfey, adding: "It cannot be too much emphasized that there are various kinds of co-operation, and that judgment on any one of them must be passed according to its supporting theory."[22] The suggestion was unavailing. All this, he says, is "beside the point." All this, I repeat, is very much to the point.[23] And by omitting it, Fr. Furfey has denatured the text of *Notre charge.* Pius X did not condemn *Le Sillon* because it "overlooked or implicitly denied that only on the basis of the full Catholic social teaching can society be saved." He condemned it because it denied the most elementary philosophical truths that are the foundations of Catholic social teaching. Its essential "evil" was not that its members had to "keep silent on the full Catholic social doctrine," but that they most vociferously rejected nearly

[21] *Loc. cit.*

[22] *Theol. Stud.*, IV (1943), 474.

[23] Solely with a view to indicating again that my disagreements with Fr. Furfey are at a level deeper than that on which the particular question of co-operation may be discussed, let me respectfully suggest that in all this matter he is arguing, not so much from the text of *Notre charge* as from the text of *Fire on the Earth*, etc., that is, from his own individual ideas on the meaning and the consequences of the statement that "only on the basis of the full Catholic social teaching can society be saved." The statement comes from no official document. Superficially, it seems to have a good Catholic ring to it—sort of an echo in the temporal order of *extra Ecclesiam nulla salus.* But what does it mean? It might, for instance, mean: Society cannot be saved. (Remembering that society cannot be saved by a minority group, and that the majority, as a sheer matter of fact, will neither accept nor practice the full Catholic social teaching.) Moreover, what does it mean when translated into a program of social action? Does it mean that we should adopt "a relative social ideal, a pistic society within a positivistic one" (Furfey, *Three Theories of Society*, p. 221)? Where the Popes say: "We must make society human in all its dimensions," Fr. Furfey says, "We must make a society of our own" (*ibid.*, p. 220). Perhaps one may be cryptic in footnotes; therefore, I shall hazard the conjecture that we shall probably have in America some time soon a debate over *Sozialpolitik* rather similar to the one that raged between the *Richtung München-Gladbach* and the *Berliner Richtung.*

all Catholic social doctrine. And its interconfessionalism fell *in obliquo* under the papal condemnation because it was related to, and based upon, its denials and rejections, its false principles and its illusory social objectives.

From this brief statement of the case, it should be easily seen why I omitted discussion of *Notre charge*, as quite irrelevant to my purposes. The document touches at no point my very particular type of co-operation—what I have called "co-operation in charity to do the work of justice which is peace." Moreover, from this brief statement, one can judge the validity of Fr. Furfey's dialectical triumph: Pius X ridiculed an interconfessional organization for the reform of civilization; but an interconfessional organization for social reform is Fr. Murray's idea; therefore Pius X ridiculed Fr. Murray's idea . . . .

A CONCRETE QUESTION

Since I am rather unwilling to be put on the defensive in this whole matter, let me here ask a concrete question. Fr. Furfey's argument is that organized activity, on the basis of interconfessional agreement, has something "evil" about it. The evil is that Catholics "must naturally keep silent on the full Catholic social doctrine" (p. 170). Moreover, it is "ridiculous" to suppose that such activity, on such a basis, could be of social value, because "only on the basis of the full Catholic social teaching can society be saved." Well, in October, 1943, the Pattern for Peace was given to the world, as an identical statement, issued simultaneously by Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish leaders. In its own way, it represents what I have called interconfessional agreement on certain necessary religious and moral bases of a just social order. The question therefore rises: Is there something "evil" about the Pattern, because it keeps silent on the full Catholic social doctrine? Is it ridiculous to suppose that it could be made a powerful instrument towards the salvation of society, because "only on the basis, etc., etc."

To be more concrete, when by means of organized activity, shared by Catholics with episcopal approval, the Pattern was impressed on the attention of whole communities (Syracuse, San Antonio, Toledo, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, San Francisco, etc.), and on numerous audiences elsewhere, was this of no value, because the Pattern does not contain the full Catholic social

teaching? Or was it of value, and of how much value? Was it a dangerous activity for Catholics to engage in? What were the dangers, and what concretely were the bad results? Was the papal peace program furthered by this co-operation with men of good will, or was it damaged thereby? Were our own specifically Catholic efforts at realizing the complete papal program inhibited by this co-operation, or were they supplemented in any valuable way? Has there been too much or too little co-operation in the field of international peace? Would it have been better to devote all this energy to personalist social action? Considering the power and strength and enormous activity of highly organized non-Catholic and secular bodies now working for a just peace, would it perhaps be better for us to apply in their regard the technique of non-participation, what time we devote all our efforts to creating an international "pistic" society "of our own," that will be "founded on faith"?

My point is that those who choose to emphasize that organized co-operation is a danger to Catholic faith, that it will foster indifferentism, or that it is of little social value because it "overlooks or implicitly denies the doctrine that only on the basis, etc. etc. etc.,"—these men would find in organized co-operation in support of the Pattern for Peace a laboratory in which the reality of their fears and the validity of their judgments could be tested. Even one who puts an absolutely minimalist interpretation on papal texts would have to admit that they at least grant permission for such a test to be made. Until it is made, the theory of co-operation must be at a standstill. After all, as I have elsewhere remarked, the papal texts do not so much solve a problem for us as put a problem to us.

Actually, these texts on co-operation challenge our whole understanding of the papal peace program. They compel us to face the fundamental question: Do we really want to see a new order established? If we do, we have to ask ourselves: Can we ourselves, by ourselves, establish it? If we cannot, we are faced with the problem of uniting with others. This is most evidently the problem that the Pope faced. He cannot solve it. He made his own contribution to its solution—the formulation in his Christmas Allocutions of a basis for co-operative union with all men of good will. He brought the problem forcibly to the attention of his children, in their hierarchical rank; and he directed in no

uncertain terms that it be solved; for on its solution depends to no small degree the destiny of the human family—whether it will live in a new order or in the old chaos.

I gather that Fr. Furfey thinks that we in the United States have pretty well solved it already: we all understand the principle of co-operation, and, with a few excesses and defects here and there, we are doing all the co-operation that the Pope wants done, in the way he wants it done (pp. 161-63). If anything, we do too much co-operating with non-Catholics. Therefore, so far as we are concerned, the papal texts simply give a warning for the future, not to allow the rise of a "spirit of separatism, which would prevent our full and free collaboration with all men of good will outside the Church"—a collaboration that at the moment is almost entirely satisfactory. Hence (is this the conclusion?) in their present and positive application, the papal texts were directed at Italy, or Great Britain, or Germany, or possibly Ireland or Spain—countries where there may be the spirit of separatism that happily never came across the sea. It was perhaps because of his great satisfaction with the state of things among us that Pius XII took occasion in *Sertum laetitiae* to make one of his most urgent pleas for "a salutary union of thought and policy," not only among Catholics, but between Catholics and our separated brethren. He must surely be gratified to see how exactly Fr. Furfey has grasped his point: "Everything in it [*Sertum laetitiae*] can be very well understood as referring to the existing sort of co-operation" abundantly going on among us (p. 167). We have nothing of importance to change or to add. One is reminded of the reception rather widely given to Pius XI's urgent summons to Catholic Action: "That is what we have been doing all along."

For my own part, I do not think that we have adequately solved the problem that our Holy Father has put to us.[24] And of

[24] It may, of course, be that we are not capable of solving it, for a variety of possible reasons: the faith of our people is so weak that it would be scandalized by strong co-operative efforts; we have no corps of intelligent, trained laymen for the work; our own social ideas and program are so inadequately developed as not to be able to support a program of co-operation, in prolongation of our own efforts, we have not the organizations or resources to offer leadership and nitiatives; our relations with non-Catholic and secular organizations are not developed; etc. (These are possible reasons; others would know their validity better than I.) At all events, if this is the case, so be it. But there is no need to deny the existence of the problem, or to imply that we have already solved it.

the theory that Fr. Parsons and I have put forward as a contribution to its solution, I may say this: no one, who has understood our position, has brought to my attention any valid objection against it. Actually, only two serious criticisms have reached me —both of them from a bishop of high scholarship and social sense. One was that I had not sufficiently emphasized the Catholic duty of leadership and initiative in co-operative endeavors. To this I replied that it did not seem appropriate strongly to assert our right to a leadership which we were not in fact prepared strongly to assume. The second criticism was that I had not been sufficiently definite about the precise way in which co-operation should be organized in the United States. To this the answer was that determination of the mode of organization appropriate to the United States falls within the competence of the bishops alone.

CO-OPERATION AND EPISCOPAL AUTHORITY

One further point in Fr. Furfey's article cannot be let go without a word. He quoted my statement that what I called in one place "Religio-Civic Action" was "removed . . . from organic relation to her [the Church's] pastoral authority." The statement is entirely clear in its context; the terms, "Religio-Civic Action," and "organic relation," were chosen to fit the context, and their meaning is quite clear from the context. But Fr. Furfey takes them out of their context. I fear, therefore, that some unwary readers might conclude that I was maintaining that the bishops had nothing to do with the business of co-operation. It would be particularly discomforting to think that bishops were peering down into the well of obscurity in which I habitually live, to see if from its depths a small rebellious fist was being shaken at their episcopal authority. Let me, therefore, briefly explain.

In the context, I was pointing an analogy between the papal idea of co-operation and the papal idea of Catholic Action. Catholic Action is the Catholic laity organized to discharge their function in the hierarchical apostolate of the Church. Catholic Action is an organization; it is part of the organism of the Church, and as such it stands in organic relation to her pastoral authority. Not only the members of Catholic Action, but Catholic Action itself, *formaliter reduplicative* as an organization is under the direct authority of the hierarchy. I called the other analogate

"Religio-Civic Action," using a capital *A* to signify that it is an organization, whether constituted on the principle of federation, or fusion, or in some other way. It is the Catholic laity somehow organized with all men of good will and right moral principle to discharge the duty that all men have to the common temporal good, which initially demands that society be established on its natural religious and moral bases. In its organizational entity, however that entity may be organized, this "Religio-Civic Action" is not part of the organism of the Church, and therefore stands in no organic relation to her pastoral authority. The Catholic members of the organization (e.g., a joint committee linking distinct federations) remain under the direct authority of their Ordinary, in all matters of social thought and action that touch on religious and moral issues. But the organization itself (e.g., the joint committee as an entity) is not under the direct authority of the hierarchy and is not mandated by it. Only indirectly can the hierarchy control the organization as such, namely, by its direct control over the Catholic members, and by its general right of judgment in matters of religion and morals.

I had thought these distinctions so elementary as not to need mention in my original article; I was content to refer to several places where this particular question is treated. Let me further recall here that I have always explicitly reserved to final episcopal decision all matters that refer to what I call the expediency of co-operation; particularly subject to their approval is the "precise form that this co-operation should take in particular regions."[25]

There is a final, cognate point. In the light of these elementary principles, it is easy to see the bearing of the texts cited by Fr. Furfey from Pius XI, in which the Pope says that the work of social reform is to be carried on *Ecclesia duce et magistra*, and that all men of good will are to be united in it *sub Ecclesiae pastoribus* (p. 166). The principle conveyed in these phrases is clear: the Church is supremely competent in the social problem, insofar as it is a religious and moral problem, and the duty of leadership towards its solution devolves upon her—upon the Pope, bishops, priests, and the Catholic laity, *proportione servata*. Consequently, there are only two particular questions at issue.

[25] Cf. *CAIP*, 1944, p. 16.

(1) The first is this: Has the Church, *dux et magistra*, in the person of the Pope, given the directive that Catholics should initiate co-operative relationships in some organized form with all men of good will towards the solution of the social problem, not only in its technical, but in its religious and moral aspects? If it has, then *eo ipso* this co-operative work is undertaken *Ecclesia duce et magistra*. Moreover, it will *suo modo* go on *sub Ecclesiae pastoribus*, inasmuch as its local realizations will always be moderated, directly or indirectly, by the local Ordinaries. I say, *suo modo*. It is fantastic to suppose that effective co-operation towards making the moral law the basis of civil society must wait upon previous formal acceptance, by all men, of the magisterial and jurisdictional authority of the Church, as the one true Church. It is entirely sufficient that men should *materialiter et suo modo* acknowledge the Church as *dux et magistra*; this they do when they accept as true the principles that she teaches (e.g., the principles of the Pattern for Peace). We cannot ask for more than this; if we get this much, we shall get a lot.

(2) The second question is, what is the relationship of a local organized co-operative association (say, a joint committee engaged in staging a civic demonstration in support of the Pattern for Peace) to the *Ecclesia dux et magistra?* I maintain that this relation is not "organic," in the sense explained, although it is entirely real, again in the sense explained. This position is quite correct.

In conclusion, let me express the regret that space forbids me to break a lance for Fr. Parsons in this matter. At that, he has a large stock of sturdy lances of his own. For my part, I do not think that Fr. Furfey has done justice (1) to Fr. Parsons' exegesis of papal texts; (2) to the starting point of his whole case (the Pope's efficacious desire for a new order); (3) to his insight into the inner structure of the papal program for social reform (the relation between the natural and supernatural truths it contains); (4) to the cardinal principles of social thought (e.g., the necessity of organization for social action) that give to his case a strength still unimpaired by Fr. Furfey's criticism.

JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J.

Woodstock College,
Woodstock, Md.

CATHOLIC MISSIONS AND COMMUNIST TACTIC

One of the most interesting phenomena of our time has been the emergence of certain groups devoted to the use of Communistic technique for the furtherance of Catholic missionary endeavor. The men and women who have formed these groups have observed the spectacular efficiency and success of Communistic propaganda among modern workers. They have manifested the sincerity of their devotion to our Lord by their efforts to utilize in His interests techniques which have been proven effective in the service of His enemies. To this extent at least they have been heralds of Christ in today's world.

At first sight there might appear to be good reason for thinking that Communist tactics could be of service to God's kingdom on earth. The Church of Jesus Christ and the political party of Comrade Stalin have certain general qualities in common. Both seek to gain new adherents. Both strive to establish and to increase enthusiastic loyalty within their ranks. Both offer a certain social solidarity and make definite promises. Hence it would seem, at least, that the tactics which would serve one would also be valuable for the other.

Unfortunately, however, that appearance is quite illusory. Both the Catholic Church and the Communist Party are teaching organizations, but their doctrines are essentially and irreconcilably opposed. The teaching of the Catholic Church is true. The doctrine of the Communists is false. The same tactic can never be employed successfully for the presentation of truth and of error. The technique for the accurate and effective expression of the truth would only serve to make error manifestly ridiculous. The methods which can be employed and which, as a matter of fact have been employed, for the successful teaching of error can only obscure and dilute the Catholic truth. Communist tactic is inseparable from Communist error, and Catholic truth demands the sort of presentation adapted to truth.

The atheistic Communism professed by those who consider themselves comrades of the highly mummified Mr. Lenin is a false doctrine. As such, it is something unnatural. A man can be beguiled into accepting it only on condition that he blind himself to the evidence that there really is a God and that the

human soul really is immortal. As a result the doctrinal technique of the Communists is necessarily orientated towards the hiding of evidence. When the comrades argue in favor of their position, the iron laws of logic require that they either start from a false principle or draw unwarranted inferences from some truth. The one thing which would be absolutely fatal to their efforts would be correct inference from truth.

For this reason the Communist doctrinal technique, as employed either by the Union Square "bolshie" or by the university "radical" involves no great difficulty and requires no extraordinary intellectual effort. It is essentially a method of persuading by means of confusion. The altruist can be persuaded by visions of a terrestial utopia, a "City of Man" in which the greatest number of human beings will possess the greatest number of material resources, or at least what the leading commissar *pro tempore* regards as resources. The covetous man can be allured by the prospect of enjoying goods now in the possession of others. The envious person can be attracted by the promise of ruin for those whom he considers more fortunate than himself. Those desirous of intellectual influence can be approached with the prospect of the mental exercise found in the nimble following of the "party line."

As far as Communist propaganda is concerned, it matters not a whit that the benefits held out to men are at best chimerical. The one thing that counts as far as the propaganda is concerned is the establishment of the conclusion, the acceptance of Communism or at least sympathy with the Communists. All is grist to the mill of the teacher. Anything that he can use to arrive at this conclusion is good and effective Communist tactic.

The teaching of Catholic doctrine is a matter worlds apart from all this. What the Church has to offer is a real communication from God, and it is the business of the Catholic propagandist to state that message accurately. If the Catholic propagandist works to influence people in favor of our Lord's Church and His teaching, he must, first of all, be sure that the thing presented to the people really is the divine message.

Furthermore, the Catholic Church announces that her teaching as a unit can be proved credible. She asserts that the message she presents as divine revelation actually carries with it evidence of divine approval for the claims made in its behalf. An effective

Catholic propaganda must adduce this evidence. It must be able to present valid and effective proofs, convincing arguments that the doctrine of the Catholic Church is what it claims to be, a message from the living God to mankind.

Where all the technique of Communist propaganda, or for that matter of any anti-Catholic propaganda, centers around an effort to prevent men from examining evidence with reference to Catholic truth, the proponent of this Catholic truth finds himself obliged to use every device at his disposal to influence men to see the evidence for his own message. Really it was St. Paul who gave the program for successful Catholic propaganda when he said: "Preach the word: be instant in season, out of season: reprove, entreat, rebuke in all patience and doctrine."[1] The teacher of Catholic truth is to employ every device of rhetoric and logic which will serve to manifest the truth. He will pour out all his energies into the task of bringing men to look at the divine message, and at the divine signature which indicates this message as something which men can and should accept. He would be frustrating the work of Christ were he to employ a technique which would serve only to distract men's minds from the evidence of truth.

The Catholic propagandist can harm his own cause very seriously in either one of two ways. He can misstate the teaching he is commissioned to offer, or he can allege as a proof for some article of this teaching a formula which is not in any sense a demonstration at all. In the first case he offers to the people a travesty on our Lord's doctrine, rather than the divine revelation itself. In the second case he leads his hearers to believe that the truths which the Catholic Church presents as capable of real proof are actually indemonstrable. He is quite likely to err in both directions in the event that he chooses to adopt a Communist tactic of propaganda.

The task of the Catholic publicist is tremendously difficult in comparison with that of his Communist rival. The Catholic must teach in such a way that his hearers will actually receive the message of Christ. He must convince men of the truth, and offer them valid arguments. The devices of rhetoric and pedantry available to the Communist would only serve to confuse the men

[1] *II Tim.* 4:2

whom the Catholic tries to enlighten. The Catholic missioner cannot be satisfied with his handling of the Christian message until he has succeeded in presenting our Lord's teaching in such a way that people can grasp it accurately. His proofs must be such as to enable the people to see the evidence in favor of the doctrine which he is commissioned to preach.

The "Catholic agitator" who attempts to present our Lord's teaching under a Communist guise can very easily be the occasion for serious harm to his hearers. He patterns his approach to the people on that of members of a party dedicated to the waging of a bloody revolution. He makes it appear that the Catholic Church seeks to stir men up against each other. He cheapens the dogma of the Church by presenting it as something to which men are to be attracted by any means, good or bad. Finally, he leaves room for the fatal implication that the Catholic Church and the Communist Party are rivals, fighting against one another on the same plane.

The Catholic Church, like the Communist Party, is interested in the workingman. But it is absolutely false to assert that the Catholic Church is the rival of the Communist Party. For the Communist party seeks the adherence of the worker by promising him an ultimate human satisfaction in this life. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, labors to give the workers an eternity of perfect happiness with God in heaven.[2] It is interested in obtaining justice for the workingman, and for that matter, for everyone else, because it is part of its mission to preach the message of the God of justice. It is in its interest to work for good living conditions for the workingman because it realizes that the worker should have what is necessary for good human life during the period in which he prepares to be with God for all eternity.

[2] Professor Reinhold Niebuhr calls Catholics and Communists "rival absolutists" because of their "conflicting ultimate claims" (*Christianity and Power Politics*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, [1940], p. 113). Dr. Niebuhr is not renowned for his penetration or appreciation of Catholic doctrine and principles, whatever may be his understanding of Marxism. "Modern culture," he writes, "confronts in modern communism exactly the same problem which the Reformation and the Renaissance faced in Catholicism at the dawn of the modern age" (*ibid.*, p. 112). We suppose that he could hardly be expected to recognize the fact that Catholicism's ultimate claims are justified, while Communism's are not; and that the problems which the two propose to the world, far from being "exactly the same," are as different as light and darkness, life and death.

The Church does not insult the worker by offering to act in the capacity of a robber in his interests. It does not look upon him as a beast, to be placated and pleased by the enjoyment of every possible or plausible material resource. It sees the workingman as one who is, or who is called to be, a disciple and a member of Jesus Christ, an adopted son of the living God. It deals with him on this level.

The proper presentation of Catholic truth demands careful preparation and conscientious effort. The cause of the Church is harmed more by some misguided "Catholic agitator" who assures the people that all those who are in good faith, whether they believe or not, are in the soul of the Church and hence in the way of salvation, than it ever is by the attacks of even its most virulent declared enemy. The Church is certainly not helped by those who seek to emulate the activity of the Communists in forming cells and "groups" when these bodies are made in some way antagonistic to the parochial organization of the Church itself.

Catholic missionary activity in our times can and will be aided through the proper use of our own resources. We must study and learn how best and most effectively to present accurate Catholic doctrine. We must take care to preach only correct and effective proofs for those portions of our teaching which we claim to prove directly. We can never hope to do much for our missionary work through the adoption of an alien technique.

JOSEPH CLIFFORD FENTON

The Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

DEUS HOMO

Without detriment, therefore, to the distinct properties of either substance and bringing them together in one person, majesty takes on lowliness; power, weakness; eternity, mortality; and to pay the debt of our state, inviolable nature was united to passible nature, and true God and true man are brought together in the unity of the Lord, so that as befitted the remedy required, one and the same mediator of God and man could die because of the one nature and rise because of the other.

—St. Leo the Great, Sermon 21, 2.

Answers to Questions

WHEN A DEACON MAY BLESS WITH THE HAND

Question: When a deacon is properly authorized to distribute Holy Communion and he does so outside of Mass, should he, at the conclusion of the ceremony give the blessing with the formula, *Benedictio Dei omnipotentis*, etc., making the sign of the cross with his hand over the communicants and others in the church?

Answer: The rubrics of the Ritual (Tit. V, Cap. ii, 10) direct that when a deacon, properly authorized, distributes Holy Communion, he is to follow the rite as laid down for a priest and no exception is made concerning the blessing at the end. This, therefore, is to be performed by one in deacon's orders in precisely the same manner as it would be done by a priest, using the same words and tracing the sign of the cross over the recipients. The apparent incongruity of a mere deacon imparting the blessing in this manner was made the subject of an enquiry directed to the Pontifical Commission for the interpretation of the *Codex Juris*, which, under date of July 13, 1930, decided that the deacon *in casu* was to give the blessing as a priest would give it. So also, a deacon who acts as the officiant at solemn Baptism is to make all the signs of the cross indicated in the Ritual in accordance with the rubric of that book (Tit. II, Cap. ii, 27) which provides that all the rites and ceremonies of the solemn administration of Baptism are to be observed even when the minister is only in deacon's orders. The salt and the water used, however, are to be previously blessed by a priest. A similar provision of the Ritual (Tit. VI, Cap. iii, 19) directs that a deacon officiating at a burial service is to follow the prescriptions of the *Ordo Exsequiarum*, including, therefore, the sign of the cross over the body at the *Requim aeternam*, etc.

HANDLING THE SACRED VESSELS

Question: May a pastor, without necessity of referring the matter to the Ordinary, give permission to a lay sacristan or a Sister in charge of the altar to handle the sacred vessels in pre-

paring for Mass and Benediction? May he allow an altar-boy, acting as master of ceremonies, to bring the ostensorium from the credence table to the altar, when Benediction is to be given after Mass?

Answer: The reply to the above query is contained in Canon 1306,§1, of the *Codex Juris*. There it is provided that the chalice and paten and the sacred linens, corporal, pall, and purificator, which have been used at Mass and before they have been washed, may be handled only by clerics or by those whose duty it is to care for them. In this latter category would be included lay sacristans and nuns who take care of the altar. No mention is made of sacred vessels other than the chalice and paten and hence the prohibition of handling does not extend to ciboriums and ostensoriums, provided they do not contain the Blessed Sacrament. Our people, however, do not like to see sacred utensils freely handled by the laity, so it is recommended that the latter use a white cloth when they handle these utensils in public. The altar-boy needs no permission to bring the ostensorium from the credence to the altar, as this vessel is not excluded from handling by the laity in Canon 1306,§1, but proper decorum would commend the use of a cloth when he does so. If the minor minister at a sacred function is a cleric, i.e. at least tonsured, no hesitation should be had concerning his handling publicly at the altar even the consecrated chalice and paten, as well as the merely blessed ciborium and ostensorium.

PREACHING COSTUME FOR DOMESTIC PRELATES

Question: May a domestic prelate wear his simar, either with surplice and stole or with the simpler purple sash, when he is to deliver a sermon? Must he wear the purple cassock with rochet and mantelletta, even if the sermon is an informal one?

Answer: There seems to be no provision for a domestic prelate to appear officially in church except in the complete choir costume: purple cassock, sash, rochet, and purple mantelletta. We have noticed that occasionally in Rome *Monsignori* of the highest rank assist in black cassock and ordinary surplice at functions of minor solemnity but there is no official authority for such a practice. In the case proposed, therefore, the full prelatial robes would seem to be required.

As to the simar, which is a variation of the cassock, with a shoulder cape and short buttoned sleeves, usually referred to as a "house cassock," it is to be remarked that it is not really a cassock in the technical sense of that word. It is not a garment to be worn in church, at least not for public functions, for which the cassock is prescribed. It may be worn, however, by the prescription of common usage, at Low Mass whether in the private chapel of the prelate or in church (Cf. Barbier de Montault, *Le Costume et les Usages Ecclésiastiques*, pp. 89 f.). The simar is proper for the house or for functions outside the church. When these latter are of a ceremonial character, the purple *ferraiuolo* is worn over the simar, the sash with the fringe being worn also. The sash with the tassels is proper only with the purple choir cassock.

Strictly speaking, therefore, the simar is not to be worn in the church and in general is not to be considered as a cassock but a garment belonging to ecclesiastical as distinguished from liturgical dress.

WHEN TWO PRESCRIBED ORATIONS ARE IDENTICAL

Question: In view of the spirit of the Rubrics, which direct both in general and in particular that we avoid using the same verse and response or the same prayer twice in the same hour of the Office or in the same Mass, what procedure should be adopted on the following occasions: (1) At Lauds on the Feast of the Circumcision of our Lord when the prayer of the feast and the prayer of the *Antiphona Finalis B. M. V.* are the same; and (2) at Mass on the Feast of St. Irenaeus, June 28, in places where the *oratio imperata* is taken from the Mass *pro Pace* (the secret and postcommunion prayers of both these Masses are identical)?

Answer: There is a general provision of the rubrics (*Rub. Gen. Miss.* vii, 8) that where two orations are prescribed whose text is identical, a substitution, to avoid repetition, is to be made, selecting for the second prayer a different form, one which is provided in the Proper or the Common for a saint of the same class. In the Breviary, for instance, we find marked for the Vigil of Apostles an alternate oration to be used in case there should occur in the same office a feast or commemoration of a

Confessor-Pontiff, the text of whose oration is the same as that provided in the first place for the Vigil of an Apostle. With this general principle in mind, we should say in answer to our questioner:

(1) On the feast of the Circumcision, when the prayer of the day is the same as the prayer at the conclusion of the Antiphon of the Blessed Virgin, we do not think that the case contemplated by the rubric referred to above is verified. It is not the conflict of two prayers, one immediately following the other, as with oration and commemoration. The Antiphon of the Blessed Virgin does not belong to any one hour of the Divine Office but is a conclusion to the latter or to a section of it recited *in choro*. Hence, there is no immediate succession of two identical prayers and we conclude that no change is to be made as to either of them.

(2) We have a real difficulty when the *oratio imperata* is for peace and, therefore, on the feast of St. Irenaeus, June 28, at the secret and the postcommunion, the *oratio imperata* would repeat the secret and postcommunion of the Mass of St. Irenaeus, since only the collect is special to the saint of the day. Evidently, two identical prayers are not to be said in immediate succession in Mass or Office. The Sacred Congregation has decided (Decree n. 3213) that even the prayer for the Pope, if it happens to be the *imperata*, is to be dropped in the Mass on the anniversary of the election or consecration of the Bishop, since its recitation would involve the repetition of the same form, except for the insertion of the name of the diocese in the prayer of the Mass. On the other hand, secrets and postcommunion prayers must agree in number and in order with the collects before the Epistle. We could not add the oration *pro Pace* to the collects on the feast of St. Irenaeus and then omit it at the secret and postcommunion, because here it would mean the exact repetition of a prayer already said. The question is not one which should be definitely settled by private authority. Our own solution, *in casu*, would be to omit the prayers for peace on that day, a procedure which appeals to us as best conforming to the general rubrical principles governing the recitation and omission of orations.

WILLIAM J. LALLOU.

RITE OF PROFESSION AND RENEWAL OF VOWS

Question: In the April, 1942, issue of this *Review*, (pp. 310-11), a question and reply assumed that "the practice . . . of pronouncing religious vows and renewing them whilst the Celebrant holds the Blessed Sacrament above the Ciborium at Communion time prior to distribution" had been abrogated by the Sacred Congregation of Rites in the General Decree n. 3836, Aug. 14, 1894, and the Reply n. 3912, June 5, 1896. Is this assumption correct?

Answer: It is incorrect, and the exact contrary is true, viz.: the General Decree n. 3836 proposed as optional the very method to which the question refers, and the Reply n. 3912 made this same method obligatory for all religious Congregations of both sexes that have profession or renewal at this part of the Mass.

The General Decree n. 3836 states:

Non semel a Sacra Rituum Congregatione exquisitum fuit: Utrum, et quomodo solemnis professio, aut votorum renovatio, quae in plerisque Religiosis tam virorum quam mulierum Congregationibus locum habet, intra Missam peragi valeat. Porro in peculiaribus casibus non una eademque fuit responsionis ratio, quin umquam Generale Decretum hac de re editum fuerit. Quapropter, ad omnem ambiguitatem de medio tollendam, et uniformitatem inducendam . . . sequentem methodum servari posse constituit . . .

Thus, the General Decree states that previous to 1894 the practice of the Sacred Congregation had not been uniform and no General Decree had been promulgated on this matter, but to remove all ambiguity and to induce uniformity, the same Sacred Congregation had determined that the following method could be followed:

The Celebrant who is to receive the vows of those professing, after having received the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist and after the Confiteor and the words that normally precede the Communion of the faithful have been said, holding the Sacred Host in his hand, turns to those who are to make their profession: each of these reads aloud his (her) profession and immediately after he (she) has read it, receives the Most Holy Sacrament. In the renovation of vows, however, the Celebrant turns to the altar, waits until the renovants have pronounced the formula of the vows; who, unless they are few, shall recite the formula of renovation together led by one of them, and afterward they shall receive the Most Holy Body of the Lord in order.

This optional method was made obligatory for all religious Congregations of both sexes, who have profession or renovation at the Communion of the Mass by the Reply n. 3912, June 5, 1896, as is clear from the words of the Reply:

A Sacra Rituum Congregatione expostulatum fuit: An Decretum Generale ab eadem Sacra Rituum Congregatione die 14 Augusti 1894 editum, a Summo Pontifice die 27 eiusdem mensis et anni confirmatum, quo, ad ambiguitatem omnem tollendam et uniformitatem inducendam, methodus in professione et renovatione votorum intra Missam servanda statuitur, vi obligandi polleat penes quaslibet Religiosas utriusque sexus Congregationes? Et Sacra Rituum Congregatio, ad relationem Secretarii, omnibus mature perpensis, proposito dubio respondendum censuit: "Affirmative; ubi vota nuncupantur vel renovantur intra Missam."

The *Acta Sanctae Sedis*, XXVIII (1895-96), 748, quotes the Reply: "*Affirmative; ubi vota nuncupantur vel renovantur intra Missam, coram celebrante Sacram Hostiam manu tenente.*" In the Decreta Authentica S. C. Rit. n. 3912, the words "*coram celebrante Sacram Hostiam manu tenente*" have been omitted.

The Sacred Congregation had proposed this method as optional in the Decree n. 3836, but in the same Decree had forbidden that such a rite be put into the text of Constitutions. The questioner in the *Review* of April, 1942, confused this prohibition with a prohibition of the rite itself, whereas the Sacred Congregation, far from prohibiting the rite, had itself proposed it, and Leo XIII had approved it.

At the present time, the rite of profession is regulated by Canon 576 which states: "*In making the religious profession, the rite prescribed in the Constitution must be observed.*" The Constitutions in this matter include not only the Constitutions of the Congregation, but also the accepted usage, ceremonial, directory, and custom book of the Congregation. The rite proposed in the Decree n. 3836 is no longer obligatory, therefore, by virtue of Reply n. 3912. The Constitutions, however, *can* prescribe this rite and it then becomes obligatory by virtue of Canon 576. Where this is the case the following points are to be noted:

In interpreting the General Decree, all agree that the first rite mentioned in the Decree should be followed in the first temporary profession immediately after noviceship and in perpetual pro-

fession. The Sacred Congregation proposed the second rite without distinguishing, at least explicitly, between a juridical and a public devotional renewal of vows. Due to the lack of an explicit distinction, authors hold that the second rite is to be followed both for the juridical and for the public devotional renewal of vows. Several add the advice that each renovant should recite the formula of the vows separately in the juridical renovation but collectively in the public devotional renovation. This is good in itself, but is not entirely consistent with their interpretation of the General Decree, which makes no such distinction. Schäfer is of the opinion that this second rite is not necessarily to be employed in a public devotional renewal of vows.

The above opinions of Wernz-Vidal (vol. III, n. 310), Schäfer (*De Relig.* n. 280), Vermeersch (*De Relig.* vol. I, n. 223), Creusen (*Revue des Communautés Rel.* X, 170) may be safely followed.

Vermeersch (*loc. cit.*) admitted that the second rite was intended for the public devotional renewal of vows, but stated that it could be adapted to the juridical renovation.

While not denying the probability of these opinions, I believe that it is at least more probable that the first rite is to be used for juridical renovation, and the second rite is to be used only for public devotional renewal of vows.

The principal reasons for this belief are: juridical renewal of vows is in its nature a strict religious profession, and therefore the rite which the Sacred Congregation approved for a "*profession*" is to be used for this renewal; moreover, it seems unlikely that the Sacred Congregation would have prescribed that the formula of the vows be recited individually for the first temporary profession and for perpetual profession but collectively for juridical renewal of temporary profession, which is equally a profession.

JAMES A. MCENERNEY, S.J.

PROBLEMS OF THE C. Y. O.

Question 1: In view of the decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments directed against the coercion of the faithful to receive Holy Communion (Bouscaren, *Canon Law Digest*, II, 208 ff.), would it be permitted to have a group Communion of the C. Y. O., at which the members would wear the insignia of the organization?

Question 2: Would it be permitted to require this group to attend a monthly Holy Hour, wearing the insignia and marching to the church under the banner of the C. Y. O.?

Answer 1: The decree to which the questioner refers forbids the wearing of special insignia by those who are receiving Holy Communion. However, it does not seem unreasonable to interpret this prohibition according to its purpose, which is to prevent the danger of having persons coerced into receiving Holy Communion. This would be the case if all the members of a society were expected to receive Holy Communion on a certain day wearing their distinctive insignia, in such wise that the failure of anyone to approach the altar rail would be noticed and perhaps even commented upon. But, if a general Communion is merely announced and recommended, and those members of the organization who wish to participate are advised to wear their insignia, in such wise that no attention is called to those who do not attend or who are present at the Mass but do not receive Holy Communion, it would not seem opposed to the spirit of the decree. The same solution could be given to the question of a group of men wearing the Holy Name insignia or a group of women wearing the sodality medal when receiving Holy Communion on a determined Sunday.

Answer 2: Since group attendance of a society at a Holy Hour involves no danger of unworthy Communion, which is the danger connected with a regimented approach to the altar rail, there is no reason why the members of the C. Y. O. should not be required to attend the Holy Hour with their banner and insignia. It would even be permissible to check the attendance at this function—something which should not be done in the matter of the reception of Holy Communion.

COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE

Question: Some twelve years ago a Protestant man and woman (both baptized) began to live together with the intention of contracting a common-law marriage. After a time they separated and were planning to get a divorce, when they discovered that the state in which they had been living did not recognize common-law marriages, so that they were not actually married before the

civil law. Now the woman has become a Catholic and wishes to marry a Catholic. Is she free to contract such a marriage?

Answer: When two baptized non-Catholics wish to marry, nothing more is required for the validity of the marriage than the mutual exchange of marital consent, which may take place informally, even without the presence of witnesses. This holds good even in a place where the civil law does not recognize common-law marriages. For the conditions governing the marriages of baptized persons are determined by the Church; and in the case of two persons free from the obligation of the canonical form (Canon 1099) the Church requires for a valid marriage, as far as the form is concerned, only the mutual giving and receiving of conjugal consent. Therefore, the solution of this question goes back to the other question, whether or not this couple exchanged true marital consent when they began to live together or at some subsequent occasion. If their primary intention, in some way expressed to each other, was to take each other as husband and wife, then they were married, even though they were in error when they thought that their mode of cohabitation was recognized as a marriage in their particular state. And if they did marry in this way, and the marriage was subsequently consummated, the woman will never be free to marry, even after her conversion to Catholicism, as long as her husband is living. However, if the primary purpose of the couple was to make their union legal before the civil law, and the intention to marry was dependent on the belief that a common-law marriage was legally recognized, they were not married, because there was a substantial error in their agreement. Doubtless in practice it would be very difficult to determine the precise nature of the intention the couple had when they entered on their union. A priest who encounters such a case should refer it to the diocesan officials.

ESSENCE OF EPISCOPAL CONSECRATION

Question: The booklets frequently passed out at episcopal consecrations in this country to explain the ceremony usually contain the statement that at the moment when the three bishops impose hands on the candidate and say the words: *Accipe Spiritum Sanctum*, he becomes a bishop. Is this correct?

Answer: It is difficult to reconcile the statement in question

with the general principle that the essential form of Holy Orders must sufficiently determine the matter by expressing in some way the particular order that is being given, or its grace or chief power—a principle that formed the basis of the decision of Leo XIII on the nullity of Anglican orders (*DB*, 1963-66). Now, the words *Accipe Spiritum Sanctum* of themselves give no indication of the episcopal order or grace or power, and hence are not sufficient to determine the significance of the imposition of hands. It is true, some theologians assert that by these words and the imposition the episcopate is conferred, but they qualify this by saying that this ceremony must be taken in conjunction with the rest of the rite. The most probable opinion is that the essential form of the episcopal consecration is found in the lengthy prayer recited or sung after the manner of a Preface by the consecrator after the imposition of hands. There are some theologians who believe that the giving of the book of the Gospel is also essential (Cappello, *De Ordine*, n. 238). In view of these diverse theological opinions, it would be advisable to omit from the rituals of episcopal consecration the statement that the candidate becomes a bishop at a certain definite point in the ceremony.

MASS OBLIGATIONS OF PRIESTS' PURGATORIAL SOCIETIES

Question: It is quite common for the priests of a diocese to form a purgatorial society. When a member dies the others are pledged to celebrate (or to have celebrated) three Masses for the repose of his soul. Does the obligation of celebrating these Masses bind in justice? Is it a grave obligation?

Answer: It is impossible to give an unqualified answer to this problem, because the nature and the binding force of a mutual agreement can depend on the intention of those who make it. Accordingly, if the priests who establish a purgatorial society intend that there shall be an obligation of strict justice to celebrate the Masses for a deceased member, and make a declaration to this effect for the benefit of those who are to join later, the offering of the three Masses is a duty binding in justice, and the deliberate omission of even a single Mass would seem to be a mortal sin. On the other hand, if they intend that the obligation shall only be one of fidelity and charity, it becomes such. They

may even agree that the pledge to celebrate the three Masses shall bind merely *sub levi*.

However, the problem centers mainly about those purgatorial societies in whose bylaws these points are not explicitly mentioned. It would seem that in the case of such an organization the duty of celebrating the Masses binds only in fidelity and charity. For, it is a commonly accepted teaching of theologians that a priest can apply a bination Mass for the fulfillment of his obligation as a member of a purgatorial society—*e.g.*, Damen (*Theologia Moralis* [Turin, 1939], vol. II, n. 203) and Iorio (*Theologia Moralis* [Naples, 1939], vol. III, n. 241). This practice was approved by the Sacred Congregation of the Council on March 5, 1887 (*ASS*, XX, 35 ff.). Now, this could not be permitted if an obligation of justice were involved in the case of a priest who had celebrated his first Mass for a stipend, since the Code forbids a priest (except on Christmas) to apply one bination Mass for a stipend when the other is applied from a title of justice (Can. 824, 2.). Furthermore, the *disceptatio* found in the *Acta Sanctae Sedis* in connection with the decree just cited states that the obligation of a member of one of the purgatorial organizations toward a deceased brother priest is *ex lege caritatis potiusquam ex lege justitiae* (*ASS*, XX, 40.). Noldin-Schmitt (*Summa Theologiae Moralis* [Innsbruck, 1940], vol. III, n. 209) states explicitly that this obligation is not one of justice.

Would a priest sin gravely if he failed to celebrate the Masses which he had pledged to celebrate for his departed fellow-members of the society? As was stated above, there would be only a light obligation to celebrate the Masses if the *sub levi* factor were explicitly stipulated by the members. But, apart from this case, it seems that a priest would sin gravely if he deliberately neglected to celebrate the Masses he had promised for the soul of a deceased brother-priest. It is true, generally speaking, that obligations due from fidelity and charity are light, but in the present instance the matter involved is so precious that great loss might be involved in the non-fulfillment of the promise. Furthermore, the agreement is bilateral, and hence imposes a greater burden than a unilateral agreement. At most, it might be admitted that a priest who would omit only one of the three promised Masses but would celebrate the other two could be judged guilty of only a venial sin.

FRANCIS J. CONNELL, C.SS.R.

ANALECTA

The *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* issued under date of Aug. 14, 1944 reports two Apostolic Constitutions, an Apostolic Letter, a *Notificatio* of the Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church, and a Decree of the Sacred Congregation of Rites.

One of the Apostolic Constitutions, dated Jan. 14, 1944,[1] provides for the establishment of the two Vicariates Apostolic of "Whitehorse" and "Prince Rupert" in the territory previously composing the Vicariate Apostolic of Yukon-Prince Rupert-Grouard.

The second Apostolic Constitution, under date of Feb. 26, 1944,[2] provides for the establishment of a new diocese suffragan of São Paulo in Brazil, out of territory previously subject to the Diocese of Campinas, the name of the new diocese being that of Piracicaba. The Constitution permits the institution of a board of diocesan consultors in lieu of the cathedral chapter, indicates that the usual voluntary offerings of the faithful and the perquisites of the Curia will constitute the *mensa episcopalis*, requires the foundation of at least a minor seminary, and directs that at least one student, and preferably two, shall be sent to the Pontifical Brazilian Seminary in Rome.

The Apostolic Letter of June 16, 1944,[3] the Feast of the Sacred Heart, commemorates the centenary of the foundation of the Apostleship of Prayer and is directed to its Moderator, the Vicar General of the Society of Jesus, Very Rev. Norbert de Boynes. Our Holy Father praises it for its specific end, the needs of the Church to be sought through prayer and satisfaction; for the fruit of prayerfulness which it has instilled in its members through the assiduous practice of the daily offering, a spirit that contributes mightily to the ends of Catholic Action; for the various other means adopted by it—consecration to the Sacred Heart, the use of promoters, the "spiritual treasury," and the *Sacred Heart Messenger*; and for the catholicity of its influence, spread through thirteen hundred dioceses. The Letter concludes with the Apostolic Blessing.

[1] *AAS*, XXXVI (1944), 233.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 235.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 238.

The Notification of the Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church, under date of April 22, 1944,[4] publishes a response of the Sacred Penitentiary of March 21, 1944, stating that the rescript of June 3, 1888, issued by the Sacred Congregation of Indulgences and Sacred Relics, is still in force. That rescript, in virtue of faculties received from the Holy Father, permitted that when the "Hail Mary" is prescribed as a condition for the gaining of indulgences, the form used by the Ruthenians and members of other Oriental Rites sufficed. The present response further indicates that the latter form may be used also by members of the Latin Rite for the purpose specified, even in the recitation of the Rosary, though as to the latter it is ordered that nothing is to be changed in the *public* recitation of the Rosary.

The Decree of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, under date of April 30, 1944,[5] reports the action of our Holy Father in decreeing that it may safely be proceeded to the solemn canonization of Blessed Michael Garicoïts, Confessor, and Founder of the Society of Priests of the Sacred Heart of Jesus of Bétharram, in view of the approval of two miracles wrought through his intercession after the concession by the Holy See of his veneration as Blessed.

JEROME D. HANNAN.

The Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 245.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 246.

THE CATHOLICS OF IRELAND

There they are, in Ireland, at the end of more than two hundred and fifty years of most hellish persecution; with all the churches taken by the Protestants; all the tithes; all the immense glebes; all the offices, civil and military; there they are at the end of two hundred and fifty years, a Protestant Church by law established, and by bayonet upheld; a Protestant army; a Protestant magistracy; a Protestant government; and a Catholic people!

—William Cobbett, writing in 1824 (Cobbett, *A History of the Reformation in England and Ireland* [Westminster, Md.: The Newman Bookshop], p. xiv.)

Book Reviews

BETWEEN HEAVEN AND EARTH. By Franz Werfel. Translated from the German by Maxim Newmark. New York: Philosophical Library, 1944. Pp. xi + 252. $3.00.

Franz Werfel's latest book contains three essays written between the years 1930 and 1937, and a fourth section entitled "Theologumena" published for the first time. It is an account of the author's progress away from the "empty shallowness of the materialistic-realistic interpretation of the world," although precisely where this progress leads he does not at present know.

Genuine interior happiness arises from a mastery of the consciousness of death and through a renewal of our spiritual powers. "For what is happiness other than the grace of being permitted to unfold to their fullest bloom all the spiritual powers planted within us?" (p. 27). World history shows, however, that modern man has steadily withdrawn from the divine; material seeking has dulled his spiritual insight without bringing him peace, but instead a vague sense of loss. In arousing ourselves from the lethargy induced by a materialistic view of things, one of the most potent forces is the "liberating rapture which the enjoyment of art brings." We have here a poignant yet hopeful portrayal of the author's struggle against a stifling materialism together with an effort to help others to see the beauty, the power, and the benevolent force of true artistic experience in a spiritually parched world.

The position is taken in the second essay, "Realism and Inwardness," that, although realism in its broadest cultural sense is a direct attitude toward life, actually the radical realism of our times has made man more unrealistic, has cut him off from his true and complete self and made him spiritually poor. The modern cult of technology threatens to replace true cultural values with an ideal of economic activity. In practice man has ceased to be the measure of things, and has come to be dominated and measured by them. Religion, morality, science and art—all have been invaded. Particularly is this true in education where the basic emphasis now is upon the "practical." To counteract this baneful influence we must dare to disregard the prevalent fashion and do our utmost to bring to the world a spiritual outlook.

The section entitled "Theologumena" embraces reflections and aphorisms on religious and profane subjects. Among these the most interesting topic is "Christ and Israel." According to Mr. Werfel, the Jews are living witnesses to Christ, and in order to fulfill this role faithfully they must, at least for a time, remain exactly what they are. The Jew is not "curable" through baptism and faith alone (p. 194).

No matter how much he may, as an individual, believe in Christ, "he is as tragically barred by the profundity of the facts from being a Christian as he is from being a German or a Russian" (p. 195). The Jew who becomes a Christian is a deserter first, "from the side of the weak and the persecuted," second, "from Israel's deepest origins," and third, from Christ Himself, "since he arbitrarily interrupts his historical suffering" (pp. 199-200). Because of the privileged place of the Jews as witnesses to Christ, the sin of anti-semitism is indirectly a reaction against Christ Himself. The fact that the Jews are still a people set apart should not give them cause for pride or arrogance. "They are as recreant, as stiffnecked, and as impenitent as ever they were in the time of Moses" (p. 203). Nevertheless, in spite of all the failings of Israel, in spite of the persecution and suffering she has undergone, the promise made to Abraham still remains valid; and one day, in God's good time, the reckoning will be settled in her favor, "when grace will have struck the balance."

To analyze and criticize in detail the philosophical and theological views of the author would involve too lengthy a discussion. It is enough to say that Werfel does not lay claim to the title either of philosopher or theologian, and we will not take our philosophical and theological views from him. For example, we will reject his position on the conversion of Jews. Over-emphasis upon the providential role of Israel has here caused the author to under-emphasize the power of Christ's grace for every individual soul. But the book does represent the sincere effort of a deeply spiritual and creative personality to expose the emptiness of materialism and to arouse men to a sense of their substantial and intrinsic worth. (In this regard Irwin Edman's sophisticated appraisal in *The Saturday Review of Literature* for Nov. 18 completely misses the point.) *Between Heaven and Earth* is not meant to satisfy the precise canons of the literati, nor is it merely the lament of one who has been driven from his fatherland; it is the impassioned statement of a gifted writer who sees intuitively the hidden dangers of materialism and who feels obliged to warn his fellow-men against them.

CHRISTOPHER J. O'TOOLE, C.S.C.

SPEAKING OF HOW TO PRAY. By Mary Perkins. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1944. Pp. xii + 276. $2.75.

A lay person translating sublime theological doctrine into the language of the laity well deserves the plaudits of both laity and clergy. It is a commendable work of lay apostolate and Catholic Action. Mary Perkins has performed a work of this kind with the publication of her new book *Speaking of How to Pray*. The work is not a treatise on

prayer as one might possibly infer from its title. It is rather a synthesis of all the most cogent reasons *why* we pray.

The book is divided into two parts. The first is a review of the great dogmas of our Faith. The second treats of the sacraments, the Mass, the liturgical year, the public prayers of the Church, and the sacramentals. The purpose of the book is to show the lay person how to live the more abundant life of the spirit by integrating into his own life the whole doctrine of faith, the means of grace, the beauty of the liturgy.

The author has treated the subject skillfully and, as Dante would say, *con intelletto d'amore,* with a loving mind, that will undoubtedly open its way to the heart of the reader. She shows great originality and insight and her interpretation is generally accurate. It is regrettable, however, that her customary accuracy should be lacking when one would expect it most, as when speaking of the great mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. The dogmatic language is obligatory in such themes. Any variation, any omission may open the door to error, as the history of those dogmas clearly shows. We have no doubt whatever of the thoroughly orthodox mind of the author and we sincerely wish that somebody had called her attention to this fact before. Here are some specimens. On p. 16 we read: 'In Christ Our Lord, the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity is united to a created human nature in absolute one-ness, identity of Person." From such presentation of the dogma of the hypostatic union, one does not learn whether in Christ are two natures or one, nor whether the union was effected in the hypostasis of the Word or in His human nature, as the text would seem to imply. The wording chosen by the author is incomplete and misleading. On p. 54: "In His Divine Nature Christ Our Lord is eternally with the Father the Source of the Holy Spirit." Again: "Our Lord as God is the Source of the Holy Spirit," and, on p. 55: "Our Lord as the Son of God is always the Source of the Holy Spirit." It is a dogma of the Catholic Faith that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Person of the Father and the Person of the Son as from one source. Is is wrong to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Nature of the Father and the Son. The Divine Nature is infinitely simple, one and undivided. Distinction or procession in the Godhead is only according to Person and not to Nature. It is still more incorrect to say that our Lord as the Son of God is the Source of the Holy Spirit. The simple faithful may conclude from this that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son alone. Failure to distinguish between nature and person has always been cause of error in the past. Such a distinction must be kept in mind when speaking of our sharing of God's life and happiness. By grace we are partakers, by participation, of Divine Nature but not of Divine Personality. Pantheists and false mystics speak of our sharing

Divine Personality. Hence, we do not approve the author's statement on p. 14: "For He — God — wants us . . . to share in His Personal Life and Happiness." What is Personal in God is not participated by any creature. The expression *Mystical Body* used most extensively throughout the book does not contribute to the clarity of the work. The term *Mystical* is not very apt to make things clearer to either a lay person or a theologian.

P. P. PARENTE

LESSON PLANS IN RELIGION. Boise, Idaho: Syms-York Company, 1944. Vol. III, pp. xiii + 447; Vol. IV, pp. xv + 340.

These lesson plans in religion for the diocese of Boise might well be in the hands of all who are engaged in teaching religion. They will find carefully graded content and psychologically sound method. Bishop Edward J. Kelly, in his Preface to the texts, sums up their purpose: "not only to make more certain what you are to teach, but also to aid you in your method of teaching." These two manuals for teachers provide complete outlines of the content of the course for grades five and six (Vol. III) and grades seven and eight (Vol. IV). Two other volumes for the primary and lower intermediate grades are now in preparation. An important and gratifying feature is explicit directions for employment of these manuals in teaching pupils not in parochial schools.

The method used throughout is an adaptation of the Psychological or Munich Method which is increasingly popular among catechists today. The value of this method lies in the successive development of a lesson from the initial concrete *presentation* of the subject, to the *explanation* with appeal to the higher faculties, and the final *application* to daily life and conduct of the pupil. This method is flexible enough to permit employment of the standard aids and techniques which give variety and effectiveness to expert teaching. One would like to see more attention given to these factors in our current teachers' manuals, in particular to games and dramatization and to such visual aids as film strips and slides. These outlines are eminently successful, not only in treating Bible history, liturgy, and the lives of the saints, but also in directing the lessons to prepare the children for a full devotional life and for intelligent participation in parish activities. The bibliography which is included in the texts is ample and up to date.

There may be a little confusion experienced here and there in differentiating some of the "activities" from the "application." Activities are, properly, specific projects, whereas formal appeals to daily life are best left to the "application" which is the final step in the teaching procedure. This, however, is a minor particular in these lesson plans, which are replete with practical directives "to learn by doing." In his excellent

Foreword, Dr. Bandas commends the authors for "their achievement in producing this vast project." With these words of praise all teachers of religion will heartily concur.

JOSEPH B. COLLINS, S.S.

THREE RELIGIOUS REBELS. Forefathers of the Trappists. By Rev. M. Raymond, O.C.S.O. New York: P. J. Kenedy and Son, 1944. Pp. xiii + 326. $2.75.

Of all the facets that reflect the rich light of Catholic spirituality none seems to create so much difficulty for the practical mind as the strictly cloistered life. The freely given service of God which manifests itself in the service and love of neighbor or the consecration of one's life in the effort to turn men to God, can both be rationalized and to some extent appreciated by the impartial observer. But the completely cloistered life, whose aim is silence, solitude and prayer, seems such a waste of life and talent. At its best it would appear a bizarre form of religious service; at its worst, an inhuman form of world fleeing and spiritual selfishness. Thus a type of life like that embodied in the Trappists very often becomes a source of distaste or of puzzlement or of weird speculation for Catholic and non-Catholic. To shed light on this question of "why men of the twentieth century become Trappists" is the underlying purpose of this book. For only by seeing the purposes that motivate these men can the life itself be seen in its proper perspective.

The author has chosen to answer his question by going back to the originators of the movement and studying their motivation and the vital purposes that guided them in laying the foundations of the spirit and life of Citeaux. The form the answer takes is neither a documented piece of research nor a pedestrian hagiology, since neither was intended. Rather, in order to make more vivid their lives and to give vitality to their ideals, Father Raymond has chosen to present the material in the more dramatic form of an historical novel. Whatever be the shortcomings of this medium, the ordinary reader will lay down this book with a better and a fuller understanding of the Catholic religious known as the Cistercians, and their offspring, the Trappists. For the forefathers of the Trappists, Saints Robert, Alberic, and Stephen come to life in this book, accompanied by their problems, their obstacles, their vision, and their abiding sincerity of purpose. Above all, they come to life as real human beings striving to serve God in the way of divine love. As a story of real men and as a portrait of a true Christian ideal the book does answer the question that the author sets for himself.

If, however, one likes his history straight, and wants more than the author's word that the story is reliable, this is not the book for him. Like every novelized form of history, the book leaves the questioning mind with some doubts as to specific accuracy. Again, dramatic as is

the form, its dialogue does not always ring true to its period. Thus it is somewhat difficult to imagine a mother of the eleventh century describing her child as God-orientated. On the other hand, if one has neither the time nor the opportunity nor the inclination to delve through a scholarly book on the subject, but is none the less interested in the "why" of such religious communities, then this type of work gives an easily-read and a valid answer.

EUGENE M. BURKE, C.S.P.

THE CHURCH AND THE LIBERAL SOCIETY. By Emmet John Hughes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. Pp. xv + 307. $3.00.

Modern historical research has thrown a great deal of new light on the path which led from medieval social thought to the fashionable liberalism of the nineteenth century. The older writers, largely under the influence of Protestant bias, interpreted the development as a glorious liberation of the human intellect. Social thought, according to them, had long been chained in the narrow prison of ecclesiastical dogma. The Renaissance introduced men to the stimulating influence of classical thought. The Reformation brought liberation from the selfish restraints which the Church had imposed. Then, in a free intellectual atmosphere, modern liberalism developed.

This view, though it still appears in popular textbooks, has long been abandoned by competent scholars. The economic history of the later Middle Ages is now better understood and it now becomes clear that economic influences played an important — probably a dominant — role in the breakdown of the medieval synthesis. The rise of capitalism undermined the preceding agrarian economy. The new bourgeoisie patronized the writers and artists of the Renaissance. The secular spirit of capitalism strengthened the new secular states and removed the last obstacles to the Protestant revolt. Modern liberalism was a logical outgrowth of the new secularism.

In our own day when liberalism itself has become old-fashioned and is rapidly disintegrating, it is particularly important to understand this history; for it is necessary to understand the past in order to plan the future intelligently. The book under review is therefore very timely. It is an excellent brief summary of the new interpretation of the history of liberalism, but it is something more than that. The author does not merely summarize existing research; he brings a fresh viewpoint and a critical spirit and as he reviews the evidence he adds his own insights. The book is always readable and often brilliant and epigrammatic.

One regrets finding any fault with such an excellent work; but one possible criticism must be mentioned. The title suggests that the author's main emphasis is the contrast between Catholic and liberal thought and

the interplay between them. Although the mutual reactions of these two systems of thought do receive considerable attention, the Catholic viewpoint does not get as much emphasis as one might expect. The rise and decline of liberalism are brilliantly handled but the Catholic alternative to liberalism is sketched more lightly. Only one chapter, the twelfth, is devoted *ex professo* to the Catholic viewpoint. In this chapter the *Immortale Dei* is cited and the *Rerum novarum* and *Quadragesimo anno* are cited at considerable length, but the full scope of papal thought from the time of Pope Leo XIII to the present requires a careful study of less familiar documents. It is strange that the great encyclical *Libertas* is passed over without mention; for this is perhaps the keenest and most basic criticism of liberalism which has ever been issued by the Vatican.

There is room for a searching study of the basic contrast between Catholic and liberal thought. The present book is an excellent study of one of the two sides of the antithesis. It needs to be supplemented by an equally good study of the Catholic reaction against liberalism. Such a study would show that the praiseworthy elements in liberalism exist, and exist on a surer basis, in Catholic thought, while Catholicism bears the antidote for the weaknesses and inconsistencies of liberalism.

PAUL HANLEY FURFEY

FIFTY YEARS AGO

In the March, 1895, issue of the *American Ecclesiastical Review*, the greater part of the issue is devoted to papers on the movement in America for temperance and total abstinence. Among the contributors are Msgr. McColgan, Vicar General of Baltimore, and Fr. Lambing of Pittsburgh. Fr. Morgan Sheedy of Altoona gives an interesting account of the life and activities of Fr. Matthew, the Irish Capuchin, known as the apostle of temperance. Fr. Heuser, the editor, advocates temperance or total abstinence as an offering of reparation to the Sacred Heart. (Why is there so little enthusiasm for the temperance and total abstinence movement among Catholics in the United States today? Is it because intemperance is so rare a vice nowadays that no such movement is needed?) . . . . A writer calling himself *Quirinus* discusses the participation of the Catholic clergy in politics. Some of his remarks about the attitude of the Catholic Church toward personal liberty are quite similar to the statements of Pope Pius XII in his Christmas message of 1944. . . . Fr. Tanquerey, professor at St. Mary's Seminary, Baltimore, gives a list of dogmatic and apologetic works useful for a priest's library. . . . The book review section contains an account of the first issue of the *Catholic University Bulletin*.

F. J. C.